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THEORIES OF LANGUAGE AND SUBJECTIVITY 201

              Foucault maintains that within the ‘formalist system’, language is conceived
            of as an autonomous structure, with its own laws of construction and application.
            The system may be constructed as total—that is to say, all possible specific uses
            are embraced by the system’s general concepts, as, for example, in Saussurean or
            Derridaean linguistics. Alternatively, the system may be understood in terms of a
            set of more partial or particularized concepts, which describe the specific ways in
            which language functions. Foucault gives as examples of these latter concepts
            the ‘sentence’, the ‘proposition’ and the ‘speech act’, as conceptualized in Anglo-
            American discourse analysis. The totalizing and the particularized concepts share
            common criteria for specifying language  as an analytical  object through the
            identification of certain uniform and general features. These features are formal
            and universal, in that past and future uses of the language system in speech acts
            can be determined from the formal concepts. Hence within a formalist theory of
            language the conditions of appearance of a particular speech act are explained in
            terms of general theoretical concepts, as is the case in Saussure, Barthes, Derrida
            and Lacan. In Foucault’s view this  approach denies or ignores the historical
            specificity of the particular linguistic act and the historical determinations which
            may influence its appearance.
              Interpretation, which Foucault defines as the second dominant feature of
            general  theories of language,  rests on a methodology  which divides up the
            written or spoken in terms of the dualism of its ‘internal’ and ‘external’ aspects.
            It assumes that ‘beneath’ the external forms of language there is to be found an
            element  which is  fundamental and determinate in  the construction of the
            linguistic system. Formalist theories are often implicitly premised on the belief
            that something is concealed within language which it is the task of interpretative
            analysis to discover and decipher. Foucault maintains that this ‘silent’ level can
            be conceived of as ‘sovereign subjectivity’, or the denotative moment (with its
            signifier in ‘the real world’) or, in philosophical terms, as the logos of reason.
              In  both  elements of his critique Foucault stresses that the possibility of an
            analysis of the particular historical conditions under which individual linguistic
            formulations have appeared is ignored or suppressed in these general theories of
            language. It is this insistence that language owes the forms of its appearance to
            particular and not general conditions which forms  the  defining  principle of
            Foucault’s approach. In effect, the consequence of this position is an insistence
            that no total, exhaustive account of the domain of language is possible. Equally,
            it suggests that there can be no theoretical concepts which delineate language in
            general.
              In  contrast, Foucault  insists  that, in terms of analysis, it is possible (and
            necessary) to isolate a certain level at which, within a historically given moment
            or continuum, there exists a radical and marked connection or difference between
            individual linguistic elements. Foucault’s basic concern,  particularly  in  The
            Archaeology of Knowledge, is to conceptualize the way in which certain of these
            elements, referred to as statements, are linked by a coherence to form and define
            a distinct field of  objects (for  example, ‘madness’, ‘illness’, ‘criminality’), a
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