Page 29 - Democracy and the Public Sphere
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24 Jürgen Habermas

                               of plebiscites (including opinion polls and media vox pops as well as
                               formal ballots) and the number of people at liberty to participate in
                               them has been dramatically expanded. Moreover, today’s plebiscitary
                               culture does routinely acknowledge the problem of the ill-informed
                               citizen, even if opinion polls and focus groups are indifferent to it.
                               It’s widely agreed that citizens should be aware of the propositions
                               and beliefs underpinning each option on the ballot paper before they
                               exercise their choice. But the governing logic here is not that of the
                               public sphere: today’s ethic of good citizenship does not demand that
                               our opinions are ‘tested out’ in the argumentative crossfire of the

                               coffee house or, for that matter, the Internet discussion group. Rather,
                               the governing logic is that of the market: the analogy is the educated
                               consumer who, before plucking goods from the supermarket shelf,
                               carefully considers the range of choices on offer and the cases that
                               competing corporations make for their products. ‘Citizens relate to
                               the state not primarily through political participation but by adopting
                               a general attitude of demand.’ 95
                                 If a lack of widespread participation in political debate renders
                               the political public sphere more intensively mediated in one sense
                               (politics is something you read about, see on the television and make
                               yes/no responses to, not something you do), then it is rendered more
                               immediate in another sense: the political public sphere is taken up
                               almost entirely with the relationship between lay individuals and
                               professional politicians vying to win their acclaim. Peer-to-peer public
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                               debate becomes an increasingly marginal practice.  Habermas does
                               not claim that there is no longer any horizontal political debate
                               to speak of, but that such debate is rarely public: ‘the political

                               discussions are for the most part confined to in-groups, to family,
                               friends, and neighbors who generate a rather homogeneous climate
                                                97
                               of opinion anyway’.
                                 For Habermas, the ‘public sphere’ has become merely the aggregate
                               of individualised preferences, an administrative variable brought
                               into the circuit of power only when its presence is functionally
                               required: ‘Today occasions for identification have to be created –

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                               the public sphere has to be “made”, it is not “there” anymore.’
                               In this context, Habermas talks of a shift away from the ‘critical
                               publicity’ that underpinned the bourgeois model, towards that
                               of ‘manipulative publicity’. Where public deliberation provides a
                               bulwark against prejudice, reactionism and parochial perspective,
                               opinion in late capitalism has been reduced to a ‘mood-dependent









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