Page 147 - Living Room WarsDesprately Seeking the Audience Rethinking Media Audiences for a Postmodern World
P. 147

Conclusions     135
        constraints. This, of course, is the ultimate power of the  television  institutions,  the
        ultimate basis of their control over the audience.
           However, the fact that instances of watching television are ‘controlled’ in this way
        ‘does not catapult them out of micro-situations’, as Knorr-Cetina (1989:36) has put it.
        Thus, recognition of the situational dependency  of actual audience practices and
        experiences  can  shed  a new light on the  fundamental unpredictability of ‘viewing
        behaviour’—that irritating ‘fickleness’ of the audience that television industry managers
        often complain about. It is only in concrete situations that people do or do not comply to
        the rules for ‘watching television’ that the institutions implicitly lay down through their
        scheduling and programming strategies in their attempts to conquer the  audience  as
        effectively as possible. Statistically constructed differentiations between categories  of
        viewers notwithstanding, concrete viewers sometimes zap or zip, sometimes don’t. This
        time they watch the commercials, another time they don’t. Sometimes, when the situation
        is right, they decide to watch an educational programme attentively in order to learn from
        it, at other times they wouldn’t bother.
           Seen from this perspective, then, variability rather than consistency of ‘viewing
        behaviour’ is the order of the day. From this perspective, what are called ‘viewing habits’
        do not represent a more or less static set of characteristics moored in an individual or a
        group; they are no more than the temporary and superficial snapshots of a never-ending,
        dynamic  and complex process in which ‘the fine-grained interrelationships between
        meaning, pleasure, use and choice’ (Hall, in Morley 1986:10) are shaped in millions of
                12
        situations.   From  this perspective, ‘television audience’ is a nonsensical category, for
        there  is  only  the  dispersed,  indefinitely proliferating chain of situations in which
        television  audiencehood  is practised and experienced—together making up the diffuse
        and fragmentary social world of actual audiences.
           This brings me to the broader implications for the kind of knowledge emerging from
                                                      13
        the thoroughly ethnographic thrust  of  this  perspective.  Obviously, emphasis on the
        situational embeddedness of audience practices and experiences inevitably undercuts the
        search for generalizations that is often seen as the ultimate goal of scientific knowledge.
        In a sense, generalizations  are  necessarily  violations to the concrete specificity of all
        unique micro-situations; therefore, it is knowledge about particulars not the general that
        this perspective tends to highlight. As Stephen Tyler (1986:131–2) has put forward in a
        suggestive metaphor, ‘It is not just that we cannot see the forest for the trees, but that we
        have come to feel that there are no forests where the trees are too far apart, just as patches
        make quilts only if the spaces between them are small enough.’ This is not to imply that
        as researchers we can say something only about one singular micro-situation—one tree or
        patch—at a time. We can, through some procedure of comparative analysis, look for what
        situations have in common and in what ways they differ (cf. Marcus and Fischer 1986).
        But it is unwarranted to add up the results into an ever more generalized, comprehensive
        system of knowledge that comprises the forest or quilt, i.e. the whole social world of
        actual audiences, because the very fluid nature of that world resists full representation.
        The epistemology this implies cannot be reconciled with received notions of cumulative
        scientific  progress,  and the partiality at stake is stronger than the normal scientific
        dictates that we study problems piecemeal, that we must not overgeneralize, that the best
        picture is built up by an accretion of rigorous evidence (Clifford 1986). There is no whole
        picture that we can strive to gradually ‘fill in’, because actual audiences are temporally
   142   143   144   145   146   147   148   149   150   151   152