Page 154 - Dust Explosions in the Process Industries
P. 154

Dust Explosions: An Overview  727

               on preventing ignition sources gives the greatest benefit. Scenarios C and D focus on keep-
              ing the dust cloud nonexplosive and using mitigating measures, respectively. Other sce-
               narios can easily be envisaged.
                 However, experience suggests that some scenarios, depending on the type of powder
               or dust and plant, are more credible than others. For example, it can be argued that a plant
              producing or handling fine aluminum flake is well represented by Scenario C in Figure
               1.140,because inerting by nitrogen would probably reduce the dust explosion risk from
               high to acceptably low.
                 Inn  spite of the objections that can be raised against the use of the various hazard analy-
               sis methods, several authors have suggested that risk analysis and other methods be
               adopted specifically for reducing  the dust explosion hazard  in the process industry,
               including grain, feed, and flour storage plants.  These include Beck  (1974,  1985);
               Sorgdrager (1985); Kameyama et al. (1982); Lai, Shenoi, and Fan (1985); and Piotrowski,
              Mrzewinski, and Proskurmicki (1988).



               1.5.2
               SELECTION SCHEME SUGGESTED BY NOHA FORTHE CHEMICAL
               PROCESS INDUSTRY


               1.5.2.1
               General Background

              Noha (1989) restricted his analysis to four groups of process equipment:
               0  Crushing and milling equipment.
               0  Dryers.
               0  Mixers.
               0  Conveyors and dust removal equipment.
                 Informative descriptions and illustrations of the various kinds of process equipment
               typical of powder producing and handling plant are provided by Perry and Green (1984).
                Before deciding how a given plant should be protected against dust explosions, it is
              necessary  to evaluate the extent to which protection is really necessary. This requires
              knowledge of ignitability and explosibility parameters of representative dust samples as
              well as information about the plant design, layout, and operation. It may be necessary
              to investigate the possibility of generation of hybrid mixtures (dust + explosible gas or
              vapor).
                Tables 1.12, 1.13, 1.14, and 1.15 give Noha’s suggestions for selecting appropriate
              means for preventing and mitigating dust explosions in four categories of process equip-
              ment in the chemical process industry. The symbol X indicates the most appropriatemeans
              of protection, whereas (X) implies that the use of the means indicated is possible, but
              that it is not implemented very often in practice.
                Noha emphasized that a given plant item, for example, a specific dryer, should not be
              considered in isolation. It is always necessary also to consider the entire plant or the part
              of it likely to become involved in a dust explosion in the system. Identification of prob-
               able ignition sources and ignition points is an important part of the analysis.
   149   150   151   152   153   154   155   156   157   158   159