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40  << Media Industries and the State in an Era of Reform

        The decision was framed as an attempt to rid the film business of “black
        money” (untaxed and unaccounted) as well as the involvement of the mafia/
        underworld. That tax-sheltered money shaped the workings of the film busi-
        ness came as no surprise, given that the Bombay film world has for long been
        a site for the investment of unreported income. Further, beginning in the
        mid-1990s, a series of media reports had drawn public attention to the spec-
        ulation, risk, and at times, violence that marked the world of film financing
        in Bombay. As Sucheta Dalal, a journalist who has covered Bombay’s finan-
        cial world extensively, wrote in 2001:


           As many as 20 films released recently are suspected to have been financed
           by the underworld don, Chhota Shakeel, who allegedly forced film stars
           into signing movies and rescheduling their shooting dates, he told PTI
           here. Since the arrest of Mr. Nazim Rizvi, producer of the unreleased film
           Chori Chori Chupke Chupke allegedly financed by Chhota Shakeel of the
           notorious Dawood Ibrahim gang, Crime Branch sleuths had got a lead and
           were now zeroing in on more “go-betweens” in the film industry, he said.
           “A few more arrests within a couple of days are expected.” 43

        Such reports documented in considerable detail the involvement of orga-
        nized crime in film production and distribution (particularly where overseas
        territories are concerned), and the complex relations between local politi-
        cians, the police, and money laundering operations involving Bombay’s mer-
        chant communities. Further, with the murder of Gulshan Kumar, a promi-
        nent industry figure and owner of an influential music label (T-Series), in
        1997 and the attempted killing of key personalities such as producer Rakesh
        Roshan in 2000, the film financing-crime nexus was firmly established in
        the public imagination, with the state and FICCI positioning tax-sheltered
        merchant capital and “underworld” money laundering practices within the
        same frame. 44
           Thus, among a series of financial and regulatory concessions that accom-
        panied the shift in state policy—such as reduction in import duties on cin-
        ematographic film and equipment, exemption on export profits, and other
        tax incentives—the most significant one was a declaration made in October
        2000. The Industrial Development Bank Act of 2000 made it possible for
                                                       45
        filmmakers to operate in “clean” and “legitimate” fashion.  Not surprisingly,
        policy shifts did not translate into actual changes in financing practices right
        away. While many in the film business greeted the government decision with
        enthusiasm, it soon became clear that “clean” funds came with their own
        strings attached. The Industrial Development Bank of India, for instance,
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