Page 101 - Global Political Economy_Understanding The International Economic Order

CHA PTER F OUR
Because international regimes frequently do have distributive con-
sequences as well as implications for national autonomy, the rules,
norms, and other factors embedded in regimes generally reflect the
power and interests of the dominant power/s in the international sys-
tem. Certainly, the liberal trade and monetary regimes following
World War II promoted the economic and, I would emphasize, the
political and security interests of the United States while also strength-
ening the anti-Soviet political alliance. Moreover, as American inter-
ests changed, the United States used its power to modify one or an-
other of these regimes; the August 1971 Nixon decision to destroy
the system of fixed exchange rates because he believed that it no
longer suited American interests provided a particularly striking ex-
ample of this type of behavior.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the regimes governing a liberal in-
ternational economy do or will represent the interests of the dominant
power/s alone and of no others. Liberal international regimes must
satisfy the interests of all the major economic powers to at least some
degree; if they do not, the regimes would neither function nor long
survive. The major trading partners of the United States were satisfied
with the postwar trade regime and, in fact, benefited economically
from the regime more than did the United States. Although a liberal
international economic order does reflect the interests of a dominant
power, such a power cannot impose a liberal economic order on the
rest of the world; ultimately, the regime must rest on international
cooperation.
Compliance
Although some scholars deny, or at least minimize, the importance of
the compliance issue, compliance with international regimes is a ma-
jor problem, and it is important to understand the reasons for compli-
ance or noncompliance. 23 The compliance or enforcement problem
arises because there is no authoritative international government, be-
cause states frequently value highly their relative gains and national
autonomy, and because there is a collective action problem in which
individual actors are tempted to cheat and free ride. While the com-
pliance problem may be of minor significance in many or even the
majority of international regimes, when the rules and principles of
23
Some scholars, for example, argue that as most states do comply with international
regimes, compliance is not a serious problem. This position, that George W. Downs,
David M. Rocke, and Peter N. Barsoom label the “managerial school,” is criticized
by these authors in their “Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?” International Organization 50, no. 3 (summer 1996): 379–406.
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