Page 102 - Global Political Economy_Understanding The International Economic Order

INT ERNAT IONAL POLIT ICAL E CONOM Y
an international regime have significant distributive consequences for
states and powerful domestic groups, or when they impinge signifi-
cantly on the autonomy and security of states, the compliance prob-
lem becomes of overwhelming importance. Many of the international
regimes governing the world economy, in fact, are of this latter type,
because they do have important consequences for the distribution of
global wealth and national autonomy. 24
Scholars of international political economy have devoted consider-
able attention to possible solutions to this problem. An important
proposed solution is based on the theory of iterative (or repeated)
games and, in particular, on what game theorists call the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. Another is based on insights from the new institutionalism
25
or “new economics of organization.” These approaches fall within
the larger category of “theories of international cooperation.” Most
scholars of international political economy would accept the defini-
tion made popular by Robert Keohane that cooperation occurs
“when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated prefer-
ences of others, through a process of policy coordination.” 26 Al-
though theories of cooperation may be helpful in explicating the na-
ture and difficulties of the compliance problem, they do not really
solve the problem.
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is undoubtedly familiar to most readers of
this book. Nevertheless, I shall provide a brief reminder: Two prison-
24 The reasons why the distribution issue is such a major obstacle to international
cooperation are discussed by James D. Morrow, “Modeling the Forms of International
Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information,” International Organization 48, no. 3
(summer 1994): 387–423. The formal treatment by Morrow and others of the distribu-
tive aspects of international cooperation have not been adequately integrated into the
regime literature. I am indebted to George Downs for enlightening me on this scholar-
ship.
25
The “new institutionalism” is based largely on the research of Oliver Williamson
and on the concept of transaction costs; that is, the costs of doing business. For a
discussion of the relevance of this literature for IPE, consult Beth V. Yarbrough and
Robert M. Yarbrough, “International Institutions and the New Economics of Organi-
zation,” International Organization 44, no. 2 (spring 1990): 235–59. These ideas have
been elaborated in their book, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade:
The Strategic Organizational Approach (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
26
Keohane, After Hegemony, 51–52. For a useful and extensive analysis of theories
of cooperation, consult Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation Among
Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics 44, no. 3 (April 1992): 466–96.
Although the literature on game theory and international cooperation distinguishes
among different types of problems, such as problems of coordination or of collabora-
tion, I shall use “cooperation” to refer to all the varieties of international cooperation.
For a valuable discussion of the issue, refer to Lisa L. Martin, “Interests, Power, and
Multilateralism,” International Organization 46, no. 4 (autumn 1992): 765–92.
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