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CHA PTER F OUR
                                   self-centered and irresponsible American behavior that began in the
                                   1960s, if not earlier. 38
                                     A major reason for the criticisms of the theory by political scientists
                                   is that it was never adequately formulated. Indeed, the “theory” was
                                   more an intuitive idea based on a particular reading of history than
                                   a scientific theory. Because the theory was underdeveloped, it was
                                   open to both warranted and unwarranted criticisms. A number of
                                   critics, for example, interpreted the theory to mean that a dominant
                                   power is necessary to the emergence of a liberal international econ-
                                   omy; they have gone on to make the point that Soviet hegemony did
                                   not create a liberal Soviet-dominated international economy. How-
                                   ever, as I have emphasized in numerous writings, a liberal interna-
                                   tional economy requires a hegemon committed to liberal economic
                                   principles, as Great Britain was in the nineteenth century and the
                                   United States was in the twentieth century; the theory was never in-
                                   tended to suggest that a Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or militaristic
                                   Japan would promote a liberal world economy. Moreover, despite the
                                   implied criticisms of some authors, the theory, at least in my opinion,
                                   posited that a hegemon is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
                                   for establishment of a liberal international economy. It is possible, as
                                   some critics have argued, that a hegemon’s interests would be best
                                   served by an optimum tariff; yet, such an aggressive tactic would be
                                   a highly unlikely course of action for a strong liberal power such as
                                   Great Britain or the United States. Instead, the theory rests on the
                                   idea of international cooperation. Hegemony makes cooperation
                                   more feasible and is not, as some have suggested, opposed to coopera-
                                   tion.
                                     The strongest support for the theory, or at least for the idea that
                                   strong leadership is necessary, has come from economists. This en-
                                   dorsement is rather amazing, because economists (with the notable
                                   exception of Kindleberger)are likely to argue that markets by them-
                                   selves will manage the world economy. The most detailed and system-
                                   atic empirical critique of HST by an economist is that of economic
                                                                  39
                                   historian Barry Eichengreen (1989). However, support for the the-
                                   ory was not the purpose avowed by Eichengreen; in fact, he believed

                                    38
                                      Susan Strange criticized my argument that the irresponsible behavior of the United
                                   States was not due to America’s relative economic decline. She was quite correct. See
                                   Susan Strange, “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony,” International Organization
                                   41, no. 4 (1987): 259–74.
                                    39
                                      Barry Eichengreen, “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary
                                   System,” in Richard N. Cooper et al., Can Nations Agree?: Issues in International
                                   Economic Cooperation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1989), 255–98.
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