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INT ERNAT IONAL POLIT ICAL E CONOM Y
                              that he had refuted the theory. Through examination of the historical
                              record, Eichengreen tried to discover whether or not a hegemon had
                              played a determining role in the rise and maintenance of an open
                              world economy. He inquired specifically into the roles of Great Brit-
                              ain in the late nineteenth century and of the United States in the post–
                              World War II era, particularly regarding the genesis and functioning
                              of the international monetary system. Although he concluded that the
                              record gave only modest support to the theory, his analysis actually
                              supports its validity.
                                Eichengreen’s lukewarm assessment of the theory appears to rest
                              on the erroneous assumption that the hegemon must be an imperialis-
                              tic power that imposes its will on other countries. His language sug-
                              gests that he identifies hegemony with coercion and imposition of the
                              hegemon’s will on other countries. Throughout his analysis, he uses
                              such terms as “dictating,” “force,” and “coerced” to describe the ac-
                              tions of the British and American hegemons. Yet, no proponent of
                              the theory has used such language, but instead each has emphasized
                              the essential leadership role of the hegemon in promoting interna-
                              tional cooperation. In fact, Eichengreen’s analysis itself confirms that
                              the British and American hegemons “significantly influenced” the na-
                              ture of the international monetary system through promotion of in-
                              ternational cooperation. Without a hegemon, international coopera-
                              tion in trade, monetary, and most other matters in international
                              affairs becomes exceptionally difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.
                                Four years later (1993), Eichengreen again evaluated the theory
                              of hegemonic stability from the perspective of historical experience. 40
                              Whereas his earlier analysis had focused on the international mone-
                              tary system, this subsequent evaluation considered the international
                              trading system. He stated that there was a positive association be-
                              tween hegemony and trade liberalization. Comparing the nineteenth
                              century and post–World War II experiences, Eichengreen concluded
                              that “the only example of successful multilateralism the historical re-
                              cord provides coincides with a period of exceptional economic domi-
                              nance by a single power. And the growing difficulties of the GATT
                              have coincided, of course, with US relative... economic decline.” He
                              then goes on to ask, “Why might this be?”
                                Eichengreen drew upon cartel theory to explain why a hegemon
                              facilitates international cooperation: “Simple cartel theory suggests
                              that it is possible to deter defection from a cartel containing many


                               40
                                 Barry Eichengreen, in Jaime De Melo and Arvind Panagariya, eds., New Dimen-
                              sions in Regional Integration (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 120–21.
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