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NEO CLASS ICAL C ONCEP T OF AN ECONO MY
                                The predilection among economists to ignore those social and po-
                              litical aspects of public affairs that cannot be modeled means that
                              economists generally analyze public problems or make policy pro-
                              nouncements as if the fundamental issues at stake were solely, or at
                              least primarily, economic. Of course, experts in many other fields
                              have similar predilections. The knowledge (expertise) of experts is
                              frequently more limitedthan they are willing to admit to themselves
                              or to anyone else. In this way economists andother experts exhibit a
                                                42
                              “trained-incapacity.” Robert Keohane, in his incisive critique of the
                              McCracken Report, has demonstrated superbly the tendency of econ-
                              omists to disregard the opinions of experts in other fields, to be to-
                              tally unaware of the political/ideological biases inherent in their own
                              policy recommendations, and to go beyond their competence when
                              advising governments. 43
                                During the early decades following World War II, the world econ-
                              omy experienced rapideconomic growth andrelatively low rates of
                              inflation. In the early 1970s, this happy situation suddenly turned
                              sour. During the previous decade, particularly after escalation of the
                              Vietnam War, the rate of inflation hadaccelerated, and this began to
                              dampen the rate of growth. Other developments, including a slow-
                              down in the rate of growth in productivity in the United States and
                              in Europe, hadcontributed to growing problems in the worldecon-
                              omy. In 1973 the crisis caused by a sudden large increase in the price
                              of oil changedmatters dramatically andplungedthe worldeconomy
                              into stagflation (an unprecedented combination of low economic
                              growth, rising unemployment, andsevere inflation). Much to their
                              embarrassment, economists hadto admit that at this time they knew
                              neither how to “fine-tune” the economy nor how to avoidthe scourge
                              of the business cycle. Trying to findout what had gone wrong, the
                              Organization of Economic Cooperation andDevelopment (OECD)
                              in Paris appointeda commission of eight eminent economists from
                              advancedcapitalist economies, ledby chairman Paul McCracken, to
                              study the situation. The commission was asked to prepare a report
                              on the “main policy issues involvedin the pursuit by member coun-
                              tries, of non-inflationary economic growth andhigh employment lev-
                              els in the light of the structural changes which have taken place in the
                              recent past.” After eighteen months of work, the OECD Secretariat
                               42
                                 This thesis is elaboratedin my book, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons
                              Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).
                               43
                                 Robert O. Keohane, “Economics, Inflation, andthe Role of the State: Political
                              Implications of the McCracken Report,” World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978):
                              108–28.
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