Page 66 - Handbooks of Applied Linguistics Communication Competence Language and Communication Problems Practical Solutions
P. 66
ˇ
44 Vladimir Zegarac
Since the function of both communication and cognition is to bring about im-
provements in individuals’ belief systems, cognitive gain constitutes the benefit
side of the equation. As humans have finite cognitive resources and limited time
for reasoning, planning and decision making, it seems plausible to assume that
processing effort is the cost parameter in this cognitive efficiency measure.
Sperber and Wilson (1986/95) call this measure relevance and define it as fol-
lows:
Relevance
A phenomenon is relevant to an individual:
(a) to the extent that the cognitive effects achieved when it is processed in context
are large, and
(b) to the extent that the processing effort required for achieving the effects is small.
Adapted from Sperber and Wilson (1986/95: 153)
On this view, the effect–effort ratio is not measured by mapping values on a nu-
merical scale. People’s estimates of effect and effort are based on the monitor-
ing of symptomatic physico-chemical changes, and, when they are represented
mentally, they take the form of judgements which are intuitive and comparative,
rather than consciously calculated and absolute. These intuitive judgments are
not merely retrospective but prospective: people have intuitions about how rel-
evant the processing of a phenomenon is likely to be, not merely about how rel-
evant a phenomenon which has been processed has turned out to be (cf. Sperber
and Wilson 1986/95: 130–131). This characterization of relevance provides the
basis for the following law-like generalization about human cognition:
The Cognitive Principle of Relevance:
Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.
Sperber and Wilson (1995: 260)
The human cognitive system’s orientation towards relevance provides one part
of the explanation for the emergence and the success of cultural categories, in-
cluding artefacts. On this approach, a plausible account of the success of the or-
ange carrot might go, roughly, as follows: orangey carrots seemed more edible
than purplish ones. Clearly, the assumption that a particular plant is edible
generally interacts with other assumptions in more productive ways than the
assumption that it is not likely to be edible (e.g. how to include it in various
recipes). So, representations of orangey carrots seemed more relevant than
those of purplish ones on the cognitive effects side. Moreover, if we assume that
the two types of carrot are known to be equally beneficial foods, then represen-
tations of orangey carrots, which are more readily (that is, more intuitively)
thought of as edible, will seem more relevant on the mental effort side as well:
other things being equal, the more desirable a thing looks, the more cognitively