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Introduction 18:0
interviewing strategy was to interview officials outside the organization
who were either located in the government offices that the organization
soughttoinfluenceorwhowerelocatedinsimilarorganizationsandwere
in a position to comment on the issues and events under investigation. 26
Because I selected cases in which there was reason to suspect that in-
formation technology had made a difference organizationally, one of the
majorgoalsoftheinterviewswastoassessthereasonsforthatrelationship
betweentechnologyandorganizationalform.Ialsosoughttolearnabout
the persistence of organizational change over time, and toward this end
I employed the technique of reinterviewing selected informants for each
case six to twelve months after the initial set of interviews. In the rein-
terviews, we inquired about the stability of organizational innovations
associated with new technology and examined constraints and limita-
tions on the kinds of innovations that initially attracted us to the case.
These cases emphasize interest groups because they have been so im-
portant in defining the structure of American pluralism. I was also inter-
ested in comparing policy organizations with campaign organizations,
whichtheorysuggestsshouldexhibitlessorganizationalchange.Without
redirecting the main focus of the case studies from interest groups, I cre-
ated a fifth case dealing with the most recent national election, the 2000
27
cycle. I had two selection criteria: to include both the primary and gen-
eral presidential elections and to include all significant candidates with
either a chance of winning or a chance of influencing the outcome. In
the general election, this led to four candidates: Al Gore, George Bush,
Ralph Nader, and Pat Buchanan. For the primaries, these criteria
included Bill Bradley and John McCain. To construct the case, members
26 In practice, success at adhering to this interviewing strategy varied somewhat across
cases, as a function of the type of organization involved and the particulars of the
case. For instance, in one case, where the goal of policy advocacy was to influence
aspecific agency decision, it was possible at the fourth step to interview as many as
half a dozen agency officials directly involved in the decision making and who could
comment quite specifically on what informants in the advocacy organization claimed
to be true. In another case, where the goal of the organization was to influence a
congressional decision, we were able to interview congressional staff but were unable,
as one would expect, to draw conclusions about influence with the same level of
confidence. In another case, step three proved especially difficult. The conclusions in
thecasenarrativesreflectthisvaryinglevelofreliabilityandconfidenceintheevidence.
In the case involving gun control, the temporary nature of the organization, including
the absence of an office or staff following the event, meant that it was impossible to
reach any key staff at steps one through three; this case is unlike the rest in that it is
built chiefly from documentary sources and newspaper reporting.
27
In a separate project to be reported subsequently, I am examining information tech-
nology and campaign dynamics exclusively.
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