Page 177 - Information and American Democracy Technology in the Evolution of Political Power
P. 177

P1: GYG/IJD/IBA/IJD
                                        August 14, 2002
                                                       18:0
                          CY101-Bimber
  CY101-04
            0 521 80067 6
                                  Political Organizations
              it covered most congressional districts around the nation. At the same
              time, the phone surcharges lost their novelty as a new “tax,” and the spike
              in public awareness of the program faded rapidly.
                 E-Rate also developed an industrial ally: the producers of informa-
              tion technology being used in the schools and libraries. While E-Rate
              cost telecommunications firms money, or so they claimed, it meant ad-
              ditional sales to hardware and software firms and consulting operations
              involved in connecting computers to the telecommunication services
              being brought to schools. A number of computer companies eventually
              went on record in support of E-Rate. One firm, Corporate Networking,
              Inc., reported a 30 percent increase in its annual sales of networking
              equipment due chiefly to E-Rate. 124  In 1999, under pressure from sup-
              porters, the FCC voted to restore full funding to the program up to
              the maximum permitted by law, $2.25 billion. The telecommunications
              firms were not interested in another fight, and by its third year, E-Rate
              wassafelyinplaceasapublicprogram,actuallyearningpraisefrommany
              observers. 125
                 The story of E-Rate bears similarity to both the Libertarian Party’s
              efforts on Know Your Customer and developments in the environmental
              lobby. Like the Libertarian case, E-Rate organizers were able to exploit
              low-cost communication and information tools to form and mobilize a
              public constituency. To some extent the coalition probably reached out-
              side its own memberships, which was the key to the Libertarians’ success,
              but, more important, it drew together a far-flung set of memberships not
              accustomed to working together and often not tightly connected to lob-
              bying efforts by the organizations themselves. And in both cases the orga-
              nizations’ efforts proceeded very rapidly in response to short-term policy
              eventsratherthanlong-termstrategicplans.LikeEnvironmentalDefense
              and other environmental lobbies, the E-Rate coalition created a metaor-
              ganization connected by information technology in which the structure
              of funding and the organization of traditional resources was less impor-
              tantthanthecapacitytocoordinateandtorespondflexiblyandquicklyto

                 Institute for the U.S. Department of Education, Office of the Undersecretary, Doc
                 00-17, Sept. 18, 2000, http://www.ed.gov/offices/OUS/PES/erate fr.pdf.
              124
                 Gail Repsher, “E-Rate’s Success Silences Critics,” Washington Technology, on-line edi-
                 tion, Oct. 9, 2000, http://www.wtonline.com/vol15 no14/cover/1851-1.html.
              125
                 For independent commentary on E-Rate, see Brian Staihr and Katharine Sheaff,
                 “The Success of the ‘E-Rate’ in Rural America,” The Main Street Economist (Center
                 for the Study of Rural America, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Feb. 2001),
                 http://www.kc.frb.org; and Carolyn Hirschman, “E-Rate OK for Now,” Telephony,
                 March 19, 2001, http://www.telecomclick.com.

                                            160
   172   173   174   175   176   177   178   179   180   181   182