Page 176 - Information and American Democracy Technology in the Evolution of Political Power
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              which runs from a half dollar to a dollar per solicitation, with a response
              rate to Congress of 10 percent or less. Because their technology bro-
              kered mail coming from citizens, the coalition knew precisely how many
              messages each public official was receiving, and from whom – informa-
              tion not available to members of Congress or the media. This helped
              coalition lobbyists fine-tune their pitches to members of Congress. 121
              When at one point FCC officials and some members asked the lobbyists
              to stop the incoming messages from citizens, coalition members knew
              they had officials’ attention. 122  By early June, at the time of the exchange
              between members of Congress and Chairman Kennard, the coalition
              had successfully demonstrated to members of Congress that E-Rate had
              a public constituency.
                On June 12, under pressure from the coalition and industry, and after
              a hearing before the Senate Commerce Committee with both sides ag-
              gressively represented, the FCC voted to “save” but also curtail E-Rate.
              The commission reduced federal funding from $1.67 billion to $1 billion,
              restricted qualifications for schools, and extended the initial distribution
              of funds from 12 months to 18 months. This move satisfied the bulk of
              the telecommunications firms, who withdrew their opposition, as well
              as the Save the E-Rate Coalition. The group had won what organizers
              called a “glass half full.” Their program had survived, but was diminished
              in the process, at least in the short run. By all accounts, the capacity of
              the coalition to produce a large, active public constituency for E-Rate on
              short notice had been a key part of the outcome, more for its influence
              on members of Congress than the FCC itself.
                In the longer run, the compromise by FCC worked to the advantage
              of the coalition. As the number of schools actually receiving discounts
              grew, E-Rate’s natural constituency consolidated. According to a report
              by the Department of Education in September 2000, about 13,000 public
              school districts and 70,000 schools had applied for funds by the second
              year of the program, along with 5,000 private schools and 4,500 library
              systems. These applications represented about 75 percent of all public
              schools and districts in the United States, 15 percent of private schools,
              and 50 percent of libraries. 123  Not only was this constituency large, but

              121
                Roger Stone, Vice President, Juno Advocacy Network, telephone interview by Eric
                Patterson for the author, May 16, 2000.
              122
                Anonymous staff member, American Association of School Administrators, tele-
                phone interview by Eric Patterson for the author, June 20, 2000.
              123
                Department of Education, “E-Rate and the Digital Divide: A Preliminary Analysis
                from the Integrated Studies of Educational Technology,” prepared by the Urban
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