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50  Johanna Sumiala

             model, the process of mutual recognition is about constructing identities. It
             is a crucial part of the reciprocal relation between subjects (see e.g., Fraser
             2005: 243–51).
               In the case of the two AG images, we can make the following observations.
             First, the spectator may recognize that the two humans are men and that
             they are portrayed as objects of torture. In this process, the men are given
             an  identity  of  victim.  Second,  the  spectator  may  recognize  that  the  ones
             committing those acts were American soldiers. They are given an identity of
             persecutor. However, this information is not in the pictures. The persecutor
             is visually absent in the images, and the only person portrayed is the one
             tortured,  and  we  can  not  even  be  sure  whether  there  are  two  different
             men tortured or just one and the same in both images. So to recognize the
             persecutor, a spectator requires contextual knowledge of the event. Without
             it, one is unable to realize that the acts of torture were carried out by American
             soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners, that there were many of those tortured, and
             that pictures were created to be further circulated among colleagues, friends,
             and relatives of the soldiers.
               Another, more complicated, argument draws on the assumption that the
             tortured person and the persecutor are recognized, given identities of a victim
             and a victimizer, but are nevertheless identified differently, depending on
             the gaze of the spectator. Identification means here a psychological process
             whereby the subject assimilates an attribute of the other and is transformed,
             wholly  or  partially,  after  the  model  the  other  provides  (Laplanche  and
             Pontailis 1973, 2006: 205). The spectator is offered the possibility to give
             the tortured the identity of a sufferer—but not to identify oneself with his
             position. As a result, the identity of the victim is recognized, but his social
             status is misrecognized (see e.g., Frazer 2005: 247). It is my argument that
             the  blindness  and  passivity  of  the  victim  in  both  images  emphasizes  the
             asymmetry in the relationship between the viewer and the viewed. Neither
             of the victims is gazing back. This fact underlines the tortured’s inability
             to establish a reciprocal relationship with the spectator: to be able to give
             the  viewer  an  identity  and  a  social  status  from  a  perspective  of  a  victim
             or actively refuse to identify himself with the identity given to him by the
             spectator.
               Luc  Boltanski  (1999)  reminds  us  that  the  process  of  identification  is
             affected  by  the  length  of  the  mediated  chain  that  is  established  between
             the  spectator,  the  one  tortured,  and  the  agent  who  causes  the  suffering.
             According to Boltanski, the situation becomes more and more delicate as the
             distance between the spectator, the persecutor, and his or her victim becomes
             greater (1999: 62). This is especially true with the AG images. Owing to a
             complex circulation process fragmented into different mediated spaces and
             spheres, different kinds of physical, cultural, social, and historical distances
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