Page 147 - Managing Change in Organizations

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Chapter 8 ■ Sustaining organizational effectiveness
Here we refer to what R.K. Merton (1940) has called the ‘dysfunctional’ conse-
quences of bureaucracy and what March and Simon (1958) refer to as the ‘unin-
tended consequences’. For Merton, a bureaucratic structure exerts constant
demands on officials to be methodical and disciplined. To operate successfully
there must be reliability, conformity and discipline. However, adherence to the
rules, originally conceived as a means, becomes transformed into an end:
Discipline, readily interpreted as conformance with regulations, whatever the
situation, is seen not as a measure designed for specific purposes but becomes
an immediate value in the life-organisation of the bureaucrat. This emphasis,
resulting from the displacement of the original goals, develops into rigidities
and an inability to adjust readily. Formalism, even ritualism, ensues with an
unchallenged insistence upon punctilious adherence to formalised procedures.
Merton, 1940, page 16
This may be taken to the extent that conformity to the rules obstructs the pur-
poses of the organization, known to us, familiarly, as ‘red tape’.
To return to our example, how did Argyris explain the apparent paradox?
Remember that the original diagnosis was that the working-party recommenda-
tions were vague and unusable, and that more specific goals and directions com-
bined with methods of monitoring and controlling performance would
overcome this difficulty. However, should such a strategy be implemented, the
members of the working party may feel mistrusted and constrained. In any event,
Argyris points out that faculty members and administrators within a college are
likely to pursue different ends and will not work together on critical issues. There
is a need for integration between the two groups, the members of which are trained
in different ways, work to different rules, with different methods and styles, and
are likely to emphasize different views of the college. There might well be advan-
tages in keeping goals vague. Specific goals might be interpreted as limiting and
not allowing the freedom to think creatively. They may result in emotional reac-
tions which inhibit performance. Thus actions which appear rational (setting
specific goals) may lead people to produce counter-rational consequences (judged
in the light of the rationality of those specific goals).

Argyris suggests that these counter-rational consequences can emerge in three
ways. First, individuals may distance themselves from the tasks in hand and the
responsibilities involved. Not feeling any personal responsibility for producing
the problem, they do not see it as their responsibility to solve it. Second, tacit
acceptance may develop that the ‘counter-rational’ behaviour is ‘undiscussable’.
Where motivation is falling, where people feel mistrusted and where behaviour
appears to be disloyal there seems to be a tendency for people to find these issues
difficult to talk about openly. So difficult, according to Argyris, that all agree that
the issue is ‘taboo’, in principle undiscussable. Finally, people may prefer coun-
terproductive advice: that is to say advice which reinforces the counter-rational
behaviour. Thus, on the course we have been discussing, members suggested that
the college president should play a game of deception in order to save face for
himself and the faculty and in order to keep his options open. They proposed
that he accept the report, thank the working party and at the same time arrange
for a new committee, or implement specific action. Such behaviour would, of

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