Page 122 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

112 Chapter 5

military leaders concluding that Iraq's resistance forces "have enough popular
support among nationalist Iraqis angered by the presence of U.S. troops that they
cannot be militarily defeated," as "a closer examination paints [many] insurgents
as secular Iraqis angry at the presence of U.S. and other foreign troops.'"3
One can clearly deduce two countercurrents in the mainstream editorializing
and reporting above: one pronounced approach which attacks resistance fighters
as working against the interests of Iraq, and the other admitting that resistance
groups gain legitimacy from the support and participation of large segments of
the Iraqi population. Seldom has this contradiction of reporting been acknowl-
edged forthright in the American press, however.
Despite the occasional admissions of the nationalist resistance to the U.S.,
corporate media has largely ignored such motivations in favor of more simplistic
negative labels. The media's overwhelmingly tends to frame Iraqis struggling
against occupation as anti-democratic, anti-American, and terrorist. Such po-
lemic attacks overshadow rare admissions of Iraqi nationalism as the main driv-
ing force behind attacks on American troops. Disregard for nationalist underpin-
nings of resistance is underscored many times over. As one Washington Post
editorial argues: "Analysts who reduce the war in Iraq to a nationalist 'resis-
tance' against a U.S. occupation should be pressed to explain the events of the
past couple weeks: the brutal murders of election officials, the bombings of
schools where voting was due; the bloodcurdling threats against those who ap-
proached the polls.'"4 Such an assessment is highly problematic. The claim that
those who rely on repressive, violent means somehow cannot also "resist" U.S.
occupation should be rejected outright. Violent resistance movements have
never been able to completely prevent civilian deaths when attacking occupying
armies; and many groups, in fact, make little effort to do so. This does not mean,
however, that these groups are not motivated by a general commitment to na-
tionalism, or a specific belief that nationalistic resistance requires the killing of
foreign occupiers.
The hesitancy in acknowledging the nationalist goals behind anti-
occupation resistance has the effect of obscuring the fact that most Iraqis are
vehemently opposed to the occupation. Rather than considering that many Iraqis
may support rebellion (violent and non-violent) as a countervailing force against
the occupation, the American media has been more interested in the pro-war
U.S. perspective that frames resistance in areas like Falluja as "a growing prob-
lem that gnawed at the Iraq occupation force for months."65 This is a signifi-
cant development in that non-corporate media outlets have often chosen to em-
phasize nationalist motivations for attacks on the U.S. In Common Dreams,
William Pfaff drives home such nationalist motivations, citing a study done by
the Project on Defense Alternatives based upon interviews with Iraqis and stud-
ies of Iraqi public opinion. Pfaff concludes that "U.S. military operations meant
to quell or defeat the resistance actually provoke it. . . a large overall majority
[of Iraqis] want the United States out. . . . Strong majorities among both Sunnis
and Shiites oppose the occupation, and significant minorities in both groups
support attacks on U.S. troops. The factors driving these attitudes," according to