Page 179 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror
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A  World of Orwellian Doublethink        169

                                   Possibly Imminent War

               Media doublethink has a primary audience in mind: the political, economic, and
               social elites responsible  for formulating U.S.  foreign policy. American  elites
               must be aware, at least on some level, of the contradictions in such an imperial
               philosophy if they are to effectively obscure those contradictions when promot-
               ing  official statements  and  propaganda.  This  should  hardly  be  considered  a
               "conspiracy theory" explanation, as individuals often attempt to reconcile their
               beliefs with conflicting realities. The trend is commonly noted in fields like Psy-
               chology in reference to the concept of "cognitive dissonance," where individuals
               hold two contradictory ideas or beliefs in their mind simultaneously.
                  Those promoting  Media  doublethink have  attempted to  straddle the  line
               between unrealistic portrayals of current events described in government propa-
               ganda, and more realistic accounts of what is really happening in the world. One
               of the best examples of the effort to walk this fine line was seen in the media's
               treatment of the longstanding policy of members of the Bush administration to
               invade Iraq-a   policy objective that spans back to well before Bush took office
               in 2000. In undertaking this balancing act, the New York Times warned of "pos-
               sibly imminent military action against Iraq"  [emphasis added] in the weeks be-
               fore the invasion.46 This problematic phrasing signified more than just  bad use
               of language; it was representative of the media's  attempts to reconcile two con-
               flicting stories:  the  propaganda  approach  taken  by  the  Bush  administration,
               which claimed that war was a last option and that the U.S. would do everything
               possible to deter the need for an invasion, and the reality, that members of the
               Bush administration had  long favored an attack on Iraq not only immediately
               after 911 1, but years before Bush took political office. It is clear that the Bush
               administration was committed to war with Iraq long before March 2003, as the
               Downing Street Memo and other political statements from former members of
               the Bush administration reveal.
                  Albert Einstein once said that,  "a  country cannot simultaneously prevent
               and prepare for war."  Mass media outlets like the New York Times, which por-
               trayed the U.S.  as both intent on war and hopeful to prevent it,  largely ignored
               this insight. The New York Times was supportive of the Bush administration's
               attempts to convince the American public that the war on Iraq was not a choice
               made by American  leaders, but  rather  a  decision forced upon the  U.S.  after
               countless patient  efforts to  resolve the  weapons of  mass  destruction  "threat"
               through peaceful overtures. Despite these efforts, it remained obvious to many
               who critically followed the pre-war political climate that the Bush administra-
               tion had already decided to go to war with Saddam Hussein, and that the goal
               had always been to overthrow the Baath regime. This revelation is difficult to
               deny in light of the Blair administration's admission in July 2002 that "military
               action" was "now seen as inevitable."
                  Prominent figures such as Richard Clarke, the former White House Anti-
               Terrorism Chief, and Paul Wolfowitz, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, ex-
              plained the long-term plans to attack Iraq in detail. Clarke recounted a conversa-
               tion he had with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld shortly after the 9/11
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