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Afghanistan and 9/11 257

Figure 10.1 Continued

Sources
James Dao, "Afghan Officials Say Aid has been too Slow," New York Times, 25 July
2002,6(A).
Cnn.com, "Afghanistan Set for 1 Billion Boost," 25 August 2003, http://www.cnn.c-
(1
om-/2003/worldlasiapcflcentra1/08/25/us.afghan/ 5 Apr. 2007).
U.S. State Department, "Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs
and Policy," Congressional Research, 15 April 2004, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infous-
a/infousaltradelfiles/98-916.pdf (15 Apr. 2007).
US. State Department, "Foreign Aid: An Introductory Overview of U.S. Programs
and Policy," 23 May 2005, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/cr-
slrow198-916.pdf (15 Apr. 2007).

To put U.S. funding levels into better perspective, the U.S. spends on average at
least three billion dollars a year (by conservative estimates) on aid to Israel, one
of the wealthiest, most prosperous countries in the Middle ~ast.'* Total U.S. aid
to Afghanistan from 2002 to 2005 is the equivalent to approximately two years
of aid to Israel. Such limited financial support for rebuilding means that vital
infrastructure projects are typically left incomplete.
By 2002, the interim Afghan government was so under funded that it could
not even afford to pay back salaries for government employees.'9 By June 2002,
over 6 months after the end of major U.S. military operations, only 870 million
dollars of the promised 1.8 billion dollars in reconstruction pledges from the
U.S. had been received, and 350 million dollars of that money had been used to
pay for activities related to overthrowing the Taliban in 2001. In short, six
months after the war, Afghanistan was only supplied with $520 million by the
U.S. for reconstr~ction?~ By mid-2002, American journalists were reporting that
social programs attempting to provide much needed food aid, health care, and
school reforms had fallen "woefully short of money."21 No serious reconstruc-
tion projects had yet begun at that time.
By late 2002, Afghanistan, which had some of the best roads before the
Soviet.American intervention, had become reliant on U.S. funding for repairing
major roads, although the 180 million dollars allocated was only enough to fund
the renewal of 660 miles of highway, with another 650 million dollars still
needed to fix main roads alone.22 Of about 13,000 miles of roads nationwide,
only 2,000 were paved, of which a mere 20 percent were "in good shape."23 In-
adequate funding for reconstruction has remained a problem in following years.
The World Bank estimated by late 2006 to early 2007, that the top twenty-five
international donors had allocated a mere 1.7 billion dollars for reconstruction,
of which only 860 million dollars had been allocated to the Afghan govemment,
and only 214 million dollars for investment projects.24
Afghanistan's economy has generally performed very poorly after so many
years of foreign intervention, violence, and destruction. Exports from 2002-2003
amounted to a miniscule 100 million d0llars,2~ while govemment revenues and
expenditures for 2004 to 2005 were estimated at only 300 million and 609 mil-
lion dollars respectively?6 Sovereignty no longer remained with the central gov-