Page 71 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror
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Weapons of Mass Diversion               6 1

                                 When No News is Old News

               The Chicago Tribune reported that, "the  public  generally seems indifferent to
               the issue [of the memos] or unwilling to rehash the bitter prewar debate over the
               reasons for the war."16 This, however, left open a crucial question which was
               rarely asked: was the public indifferent because it did not care about the memos'
               contents, or because much of the public never saw their contents? Most of the
               American  public  did  not  have  extensive,  if  any,  exposure  to  the  memos,
               primarily as a result of the  lack of  attention paid  to the issue throughout the
               media and amongst political leaders. It was only after extensive coverage of the
               memos in the independent media that a small segment of the public complained
               to mass media outlets about their concerns over the  lack of public exposure.
               This,  in  turn,  elicited more extensive coverage of  the memos throughout  the
              press,  as  seen  in  many  of  the  stories  described  above,  although  the  issue,
               disturbingly, received less attention then celebrity news stories such as the Laci
               Peterson murder trial, which became a much larger issue in terms of round-the-
               clock media coverage. Media critics complained that the mainstream press was
               neglecting the story because it threatened to undermine the Bush administration
               during  a  time  of  war.  FAIR  condemned  the  "profound  defensiveness"  of
               reporters  who  de-emphasized the  memo.  According  to  FAIR,  the  common
               argument  that  "the  memo  wasn't  news  because  it  contained  no  'new'
               information--only raises troubling questions about what journalists were doing
               when they should have been reporting on the gulf between official White House
              pronouncements and actual White House  intention^."'^
                  In reality, mainstream media outlets did not ignore or downplay the memos
               in 2002 and early 2003 because they were "old news." There was no systematic
               effort during the run-up to the Iraq war to highlight the fact that the Bush and
              Blair  governments  had  decided  well  before  March  2003  to  invade  Iraq,
              regardless of whether weapons of mass destruction were found. To have placed
              such  an  emphasis  on  government  deception  at  the  time  would  likely have
              encouraged a larger number of Americans to question what potential ulterior
              motives the Bush administration possessed  for wanting to invade Iraq. In the
              end,  no  alternative explanations were  provided  in the  vast  majority of  mass
              media reporting.


                                  The WMD Debacle Begins:
                                       A Brief History

              On September 12, 2002, President Bush formally announced to the international
              community that  Saddam Hussein possessed  weapons of mass destruction and
              had  to  be  disarmed. "[Iraq]  possesses and  produces chemical  and  biological
              weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons"  and "Members of the Congress" and
              "the United Nations Security Council, agree that Saddam Hussein is a threat to
              peace and  must  di~arm."'~ Throughout the next six months, the White House
              initiated and pursued a long and  arduous campaign to convince the American
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