Page 67 - Mass Media, Mass Propoganda Examining American News in the War on Terror

Weapons of Mass Diversion

Anthony DiMaggio and Paul Fasse

On May 1, 2005, the Times of London put forth a major challenge to the Bush
administration by questioning the official justifications for going to war with
Iraq. By reporting on the "Downing Street Memo," the Times provided intimate
details on the Bush administration's one-sided use of pre-war intelligence and
manipulation of public opinion concerning Iraq's alleged weapons of mass
destruction.' There was only one problem-the American media's attention was
directed elsewhere. The media's lack of emphasis on the memos meant that the
American public was largely prevented from accessing vital information about
the Bush administration's pre-war motives.
Marked "extremely sensitive," the first declassified Downing Street Memo
(in a series of them) was never intended to be viewed by the British or American
public. The memo was only meant to be seen by those in the British government
with a "genuine need to know its contents." The memo revealed at least three
points in relation to the Iraq war: 1. Despite public statements announcing the
opposite, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and U.S. President George W. Bush
both decided on "regime change" in Iraq long before the invasion in March of
2003; 2. The Blair government and the Bush administration framed pre-war
intelligence in a one-sided manner so as to discount information that was critical
of the claim that Iraq possessed WMD. This was apparent when the Blair
administration admitted that "the [WMD] intelligence and facts were being fit
around the policy of regime change"; and 3. Blair pursued the Iraq war knowing
that it was a violation of international law, and instead of tailoring their actions
to fit within the standards of such laws, he attempted to use the United Nations
and WMD disarmament as a pretext for going to war.