Page 31 - Media Effects Advances in Theory and Research
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20                                                      ZILLMANN

           Implicit in this contention is that if relevant events were deemed alike,
        they were lumped together in one category. Not that the events were nec-
        essarily considered to be identical. But they were considered alike for
        their sharing of essential features. The existence of concomitant irrelevant
        differences did not deter from the practical merit of such event catego-
        rization (Burns, 1992; Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Mervis & Rosch,
        1981; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978).
           The categorization of events allowed the aggregation of limited numbers
        of individual cases. This sampling of cases could be used to extrapolate
        information about other events within the same category, potentially about
        all other such events. Stored in memory, the aggregated segments of perti-
        nent experience defined compounded knowledge about past occurrences
        that could guide future behavior. It fostered dispositions and ultimately
        directed actions toward similar occurrences on later encounter. A compara-
        tively small number of experiences thus served as the basis for the percep-
        tion of a larger body of like occurrences. The implicit generalization
        amounts to a spontaneously executed inductive inference. Inferences of this
        kind are made by all species capable of adaptation through learning.
        Humans, no doubt, have made these inferences through the millennia. They
        are still making them, routinely so, and nonconsciously for the most part.
           The reliance on categorized events of primary experience has not
        appreciably changed for nonhuman species. For humans, in contrast, the
        experience base has been vastly expanded. With the refinement of com-
        munication skills, especially with the emergence of linguistic competen-
        cies, the pertinent experiences of others became communicable, and phe-
        nomena had to be judged by integrating primary experiences with
        communicated ones. However, communicated experiences were not nec-
        essarily others’ primary ones. They could be accounts from third parties
        and amount to unreliable hearsay.
           The indicated broadening of the experiential base is obviously advan-
        tageous in enabling individuals to judge phenomena lying outside the
        bounds of their own limited experience. It came at a cost, however. Expe-
        riences related by others could be self-serving, inadvertently erroneous,
        or deliberately deceptive. It thus became prudent to be on guard about
        others’ communicative intentions. The apparent need for caution became
        imperative, in fact, for direct interpersonal communication generally, and
        for any mediated extension thereof in particular.


                           ECOLOGY OF MEDIATION

        Considering the dissemination of information by media institutions, a call
        for caution is especially warranted. This is because such dissemination
        reaches large numbers of people, often the citizenry at large. The provision
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