Page 31 - Contribution To Phenomenology
P. 31

24                      LESTER   EMBREE

              practical  consequences.  It  might  be  argued,  however,  that  both  the
              scientific  action  and  the  theoretical  endeavor  need  to  be  distinguished  if
              only  because  what  is  involved  in  making  an  action  scientific  as  well  as
              how  theoretical  results  are  made  useful  can  then  be  better  understood,
              evaluated,  and  accomplished.  Contrariwise,  if  one  chose  to  impede  the
              responsible  application  of  theoretical  science,  obscuring  this  difference
              might  be  useful.
                Evaluation  or  the  valuing  of  beUeved-in  possibihties  and  relations,
              especially  the  pathic  constitution  of  effects  with  intrinsic  values  and  of
              causes  with  extrinsic  values,  is  central  to  the  motivation  of  action.  Since
              it  is  positive  valuing  that  motivates  action  that  is  positive,  i.e.,  creative
              and  preservative,  and  negative  valuing  that  motivates  action  that  is
              negative,  i.e.,  destructive  and  preventative,  it  is  possible  to  confuse  these
              strata  and  the  objects constituted  in  them. There  is a  parallelism  between
              the  end-  and  the  means-characteristics  of  objects  and  the  intrinsic  and
              extrinsic  values  that  the  same  objects  also  typically  have  and  this  can
              similarly  lead  to  confusion.  Nevertheless,  if  one  looks  to  whether  the
              practice  is  directed  at  affecting  a  course  of  events  rather  than  merely
              liking  or  disliking  this  or  that  possible  future  sequence,  the  distinction
              between  the  habitual  positional  strata  in  the  intentive  process  and  the
              parallel  distinction  between  the  cultural  characteristics,  the  values  and
              uses,  in  the  objects  as  they  are  intended  to  can  be  made.
                Intentive  life  can  seem  more  conspicuously  involved  with  somatic  or
             bodily states and processes  in  predominantly practical  than in predominate-
              ly  evaluational  or  predominately  cognitive  life,  for  bodily  movements  are
              necessary  to  affecting  a  course  of  events,  but  it  takes  only  a  little
              reflection  to  recognize  that  bodily  movement  is  also  involved  in  the
              sensuous  awareness  underlying  the  rest  of  hfe.  The  eyes,  for  example,
              need  to  be  open  and  pointed  in  a  direction  for  something  to  be  seen.
             Even  the  expressing  of  a  proposition  requires  movement  of  lips  or
             fingers.  The  danger  in  investigating  the  role  of  movement  (and  staying
             still  is,  in  this  signification,  a  movement,  just  as  non-intervention  is  a
             willing  to  affect  a  course  of  events)  may  not  be  to  omit  the  body  but
             rather  to  concentrate  on  somatic  movement  to  the  behavioristic  disregard
             of  the  willing  that  makes  it  action  and  in  relation  to  which  objects  are
             ends  and  means.
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