Page 333 - Contribution To Phenomenology

326 DAVID CARR

Yet at the same time we are not subject to nature. We do not allow
ourselves to succumb to her or be controlled by her; intentionality makes
our relationship with her the very sign and exercise of our freedom.
In short, intentionality arises in philosophy in response to a problem
we have with the natural world, a situation in which our connection with
it and our freedom from it seemed seriously jeopardized. And inten-
tionality provides us with a vision of ourselves in which we reestablish
contact with nature, gain control and mastery over her, and liberate
ourselves from her all in one stroke.
Looked at in this way, intentionaUty, together with the whole
philosophical development which culminates in it, is simply another facet
of the struggle between modern "man" and nature for domination,
control, freedom and dignity which goes by the name of technology.
Modern philosophy has, since Descartes, been occasioned by the growth
of modern natural science, and has responded to problems created by it.
It has been the handmaiden of modern science, allowing science to do
its work while preserving its author (man) from suffering indignities in the
process. In short, it is all part of the story of becoming the masters and
possessors of nature rather than allowing her to master and possess us.
And intentionality can be seen as just the latest chapter in that story.
I should repeat that intentionaUty can only function in this way if it
is treated as a principle rather than as something to be explained or
derived. Philosophers Uke Daniel Dennett, who recognize the power and
pervasiveness of intentionaUty in our concept of mind, stiU try to reduce
it to a causal relation or the result of a causal relation, even though they
realize how hard a task that is. Husserl and the phenomenologists simply
refuse to acknowledge such a task, let alone undertake it.
But how can they fail to acknowledge its necessity? Is not the
mind/brain part of nature? And is not everything in nature, including the
mind, guided by the same causal principles? Of course it is, if we assume
the universaUty and necessity of the causal order. But that is an
assumption and nothing more. Once made, as it is always made by the
scientist, it imposes the obUgation to take in everything. But once we
recognize as philosophers that it is only an assumption, we need not
aUow ourselves to be guided by it. It imposes no obUgation on us.
Dennett, SeUars, Quine, and other scientific reaUsts are quite clear on
this by now. Their commitment to the universaUty of the causal order,
and to the causal explanation of everything that faUs under it, is just that,
a commitment one takes on like a reUgious vow. It is stated "up front,"