Page 336 - Contribution To Phenomenology
P. 336

PHENOMENOLOGICAL SOCIAL           THEORY            329

              Husserl  to  have  failed  at  this  because  it  cannot  be  done.  "Inter-
              subjectivity  is  not  a  problem  of  constitution  which  can  be  solved  within
              the  transcendental  sphere,  but  is  rather  a  datum  (Gegebenheit) of  the
              life-world . .  the  fundamental  ontological  category  of  human  existence
                       .
              in  the  world.  .  .  ."^  This  ringing  declaration  is  taken  by  many  to  be  a
              great  advance  over  Husserl  and  to  express  the  move  by  which  Schutz,
              Merleau-Ponty,  and  others  liberate  themselves  from  the  transcendental
             version  of  phenomenology  in  favor  of  its  "existential" version.  This  might
             be  taken  to  mean  that  these  philosophers  are  no  longer  concerned  with
             the  philosophical  problem  of  our knowledge  of  other  minds.
                The  fact  remains  that  Schutz,  throughout  his  career,  presents  himself
             as  attempting  to  work  out  the  foundation  of  the  social  sciences. And
             even  Merleau-Ponty  rarely  discussed  the  problem  of  "relations  with
             others" without  linking  it  with  the  problem  of  the  "sciences  de  Thomme."
             In  such  sciences,  obviously,  the  philosophical  problems  of  skepticism,
             solipsism,  and  concept  derivation  have  no  place,  but  the  point  is  to  take
             this  "datum  of  the  life-world"  and  subsume  it  under  the  sort  of  rigorous
             and  wide-ranging  concepts  that  make  for  scientific  treatment.
                Could  it  be  that  these  thinkers,  at  least  impUcitly,  construe  the  other
             principally  as  an  object  of  knowledge, or  potential  knowledge?  And  could
             this  be  a  further  effect  of  the  concept  of  intentionaUty,  however  flexibly
             it  may  be  treated  by  these  post-Husserlian  phenomenologists?
                To  be  sure,  it  is  not  only  the  concept  of  intentionaUty  but  also  that
             of  science  that  they  treat  flexibly.  Schutz  and  Merleau-Ponty  belong  to
             a  long line  of  philosophers  (beginning with  Dilthey  and  the  neo-Kantians)
             who  adamantly  refuse  to  treat  the  Geisteswissenschaften  or  sciences
             humaines  as  continuous with  the  natural sciences.  Nothing  is  farther  from
             their  intentions  than  to  reduce  the  human world  to a  collection  of  objects
             or  events  to  be  treated  according  to  causal  relations  or  laws.
                But  there  are  features  of  the  concept  of  science,  even  after  we
             eliminate  the  reductionistic  connotation  of  the  English  term  and  are
             guided  by  the  broader  scope  of  the  term  Wissenschaft,  which  are  carried
             along  by  Schutz  and  which  may  stand  in  the  way  of  our  understanding
             of  the  social.  For  Husserl,  of  course,  the  other  is  still  a  Gegenstand  in
             the  broadest  sense,  which  belongs  to  a  domain  or  region  of  being,
             dominated  by  its  own  material a priori laws.  And  over  against  that  object



                ^  Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers HI: Studies in Phenomenological Philosophy, edited
             by I. Schutz (The Hague: M. Nijhoff,  1967), 82.
   331   332   333   334   335   336   337   338   339   340   341