Page 80 - Contribution To Phenomenology
P. 80

PHENOMENOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE                    73

              Although  Johnson  describes  three  different  "out"  schemata,  all  of  the
              sentences  cited  here  are  based  on  one  such  schema.  In  this  schema  an
              entity  is  first  contained  within  something  and  then  moves  outside  of  that
              thing  (p.  33).  The  meaningfulness  of  these  propositions  depends  upon
              the  meaningfulness  of  a  single  prelinguistic  schema.  The  schema  itself  is
              first  constituted  through  bodily  activity:  we  move  our  bodies  out  of  a
              container  (say,  a  room  or a  bed)  to  some  space  outside  of  this  container.
              It  is,  then,  what  Merleau-Ponty  would  call  "the  body-subject'*  that  turns
              out  to  be  the  structuring  source  of  meaningfulness  and  a  meaningful
              world  (Merleau-Ponty,  1%2).
                If  it  is  true  that  all  of  these  propositions  depend  for  their  meaning-
              fuhiess  on  an  "out" schema  that  is  constituted  through  bodily  movement
              "out" of  some  spatial  location,  then  the first proposition,  "John went  out
              of  the  room," is  closest  to  this  root  meaning.  And  as  the  list  of  proposi-
              tions  proceeds,  the  verb  forms  become  more  "metaphorical"  while  still
              remaining  based  on  this  root  meaning.  "Weasling  out  of  the  contract"
              signifies  "movement"  from  one  "place"  (viz.,  within  the  contract)  to
              another  "place"  (viz.,  outside  of  the  contract);  but  the  "places"  are  no
              longer  spatial  locations  strictly  speaking,  and  the  "movement"  is  not
              bodily movement  through space.  This metaphorical  projection of  the  "out"
              schema  illustrates  one  of  Johnson's  main  theses:  "schematic  structures
              saUent  in  most  of  our  mundane  experience  .  .  .  can  be  extended  and
              elaborated  metaphorically  to  connect  up  different  aspects  of  meaning,
              reasoning,  and  speech  acts"  (p.  65).
                In  order  to  demonstrate  these  processes  of  metaphorical  projection,
              Johnson first explicates  the  image  schema  of  "balance." This  schema,  like
              all  others,  is  first  constituted  in  bodily  experiences  and  activities.  As
              Johnson  phrases  it,  ".  .  .  the  meaning  of  balance  begins  to  emerge
              through  our  acts  of  balancing  and  our  experience  of  systemic  processes
              and  states  within  our  bodies"  (p.  75).  The  schema  that  emerges  in  this
              way  includes,  among  its  gestalt-constituents,  weight  and  force.
                Johnson  then  shows  how  other  reaUties  such  as  paintings  and  masks
              can  be  perceived  as  "balanced." Such  perception  involves  a  metaphorical
             projection of  the  gestalt-constituents  of  the  embodied  image  schema  onto
              another  domain.  Seeing  the  mask  as  balanced  involves  "the  projection
              of  structure fi*om one  domain  (that  of  gravitational  and  other  physical
              forces)  onto  another  domain  of  a  different  kind  (spatial  organization  in
              visual  perception)"  (p.  82).  In  seeing  the  mask  it  is  not  simply  the  case
              that the  lines  and  shapes  on  each  side  of  it  are  perceived  as  symmetrical.
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