Page 122 - Privacy in a Cyber Age Policy and Practice

110 PRIVACY IN A CYBER AGE

violate privacy—these releases encounter several difficulties. Each piece of
information released potentially helps the adversaries. This is, in effect, the
way intelligence work is often done—by piecing together details released
by various sources. Thus, the publication of information about which past
operations of terrorists the government aborted could allow those groups
to find out which of their plots failed because of American government
interventions and which failed because of technical flaws, the weakness
of their chosen agents, or some other reason. Also, it is nearly impossible
to spell out how these cases unfolded without giving away details about
sources and methods; that is, unless the government releases misleading
details. Sooner or later, though, some whistleblower would likely expose
the ploy, undermining the whole enterprise, which was meant to build
trust in government. Thus, one intelligence official reports that the leaks
regarding the NSA snooping programs have already led to terrorist groups
“changing their communications behavior based on these disclosures,”
meaning that we might “miss tidbits that could be useful in stopping the
next plot.” 40
Moreover, however much information about specific cases the gov-
ernment releases, skeptics are sure to find details that need further clarifica-
tion and documentation. (This is the reason public relations experts urge
those whose misdeeds are under public scrutiny to “tell all” right from the
start, which is a strategy that may serve well politicians who cheat on their
spouses, but would not serve those who deal with combating terrorism.)
Thus, following the uproar over PRISM, technology companies sought to
“reassure users” by releasing reports on the frequency of government data
requests. The result, as reported by The New York Times, was that “rather
than provide clarity, the companies’ disclosures have left many questions
41
unanswered.” When NSA Director General Keith Alexander released
details about how the agency’s surveillance programs had thwarted terrorist
42
plots, the media immediately asked for more. Moreover, there is no way
for the media to determine whether the released cases are typical or were
chosen because they reflect well on the government.
By contrast, a representative democracy approach suggests that one
ought to search for ways to enhance the accountability and oversight
power of various institutions including Congressional committees, the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) appeal courts, the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), various inspectors general, and privacy
officers.
A report on the operation of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
(TFTP) provides a powerful example. A project developed by the U.S.
Treasury, the TFTP collects large amounts of data from a financial messag-
ing system, called Swift, that records data on financial transfers that were