Page 123 - Privacy in a Cyber Age Policy and Practice

LIBERAL COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY 111

conducted. The TFTP used this information to uncover terrorist networks
43
and to prevent multiple attacks. Importantly, the TFTP was subjected to
significant oversight, with only narrowly focused searches and analyses of
the data being permitted, and two different groups of independent auditors
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ensuring that those restrictions were being strictly adhered to. Moreover,
any time a government analyst wanted to query the system, they would
have to submit a reason for their request, which could then be approved or
denied by a Swift representative. 45
Briefing many more members of Congress may well not be the best way
to proceed, as most members of Congress do not have the security clear-
ance that the members and key staffers of the intelligence committees of
Congress possess, and many are known to be notorious leakers themselves.
Moreover, the public’s trust in Congress is at a historical low point.
Instead, the media and the public would benefit from a regular review
conducted by an independent civilian review board. Such a board would be
composed of individuals like those who served on the 9/11 Commission:
bipartisan, highly respected by the public, able to work together, not run-
ning for office, and possessing the necessary security clearance. While not
everyone agreed with that commission’s conclusions, the members were
still well-respected and largely trusted, and many of their recommenda-
tions were eventually implemented.
The new board would issue reports, perhaps annually, that would state
whether the government collected information for political reasons or
security concerns, whether they collected information in the pursuit of
minor crimes rather than terrorists, and generally whether they did so for
legitimate and legal goals. However, instead of revealing detailed case stud-
ies, the civilian review board would provide statistics. For example, if it
reported that there were a large number of cases in which serious threats
were averted, such as the planned attack on New York City’s subway, the
public would learn that the threats to national security warranted increased
efforts to enforce anti-leak legislation. If, on the other hand, the board
reported that many cases involve fairly minor threats, this would tilt the
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consensus the other way. (If the current Civil Liberties and Privacy Pro-
tection board would be properly staffed, funded, and its powers increased,
it might serve such a function).

3. Can We Trust the Government?

A common claim among civil libertarians is that even if little harm is pres-
ently being inflicted by government surveillance programs, the infrastruc-
ture is in place for a less-benevolent leader to violate the people’s rights and
set us on the path to tyranny. For example, it has been argued that PRISM