Page 165 - Privacy in a Cyber Age Policy and Practice

BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 153

changing the committees that are charged with overseeing the NSA. Each
and all of these measures deserve close study. Some of these moves are
clearly necessary to further ensure that the NSA abides by all the applicable
laws and regulations and to assure the public that it does. Given the current
level of distrust of the government in general, one must wonder if even all
these measures taken together would suffice or if some extraordinary steps
need to be taken; the next section explores this.

4. Civic Oversight

Consideration should be given to introducing a greater role for civic
bodies that are not part of the government but that help oversight; a regular
review conducted by an independent civilian review board is one example.
Such a board would be composed of the kind of people who served on
the 9/11 Commission: bipartisan, highly respected by the public, able to
work together, not running for office, and possessing the necessary security
clearance. While not everyone agreed with that commission’s conclusions,
they were still well-respected and largely trusted, and many of their recom-
mendations were eventually implemented. (Critics of this proposal may
suggest that these missions are already carried out by the Civil Liberties
Board and the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board [PIAB].)
However, these bodies have not been given the power they need for
important segments of the public—the parts that have legitimate concerns,
rather than the parts that automatically distrust all government does and
states—to feel confident that accountability is adequate.
The new board would issue reports that would state whether or not
the government collected information for political reasons (as opposed to
security concerns), in the pursuit of minor criminals (as opposed to ter-
rorists), or for legitimate and legal goals. However, instead of revealing
detailed case studies, the civilian review board would provide statistics.
For example, if the board were to report that there were a large number
of cases in which serious threats, such as the planned attack on New York
City’s subway system, were averted, the public would learn that the threats
to national security warranted increased efforts to enforce antileak legisla-
tion. If, on the other hand, the board reported that many cases involved
fairly minor threats, this would tilt the consensus the other way. 231 (If the
current Civil Liberties and Privacy Protection Board were to be properly
staffed, funded, and granted more power, it might serve such a function).
The board should ensure that the government is adequately kept in check
while also ensuring that the system of accountability does not tilt too far
in the opposite direction by placing too many restraints on the NSA. One