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DNA SEARCHES:  A LIBERAL COMMUNITARIAN APPROACH  175

           offenders. Indeed, partly thanks to FBI and National Institute of Justice
           grants, the private sector has in recent years begun to roll out faster tech-
           nologies for DNA testing, which, with refinement and economies of scale,
           may well go a long way toward greatly reducing the backlog problem. 120

                              2. The Right to be Cleared

           Contrary to the view that while forensic DNA usages may benefit the
           common good, these gains come at the expense of significant violations of
           individual rights, such usages greatly advanced both elements of the liberal
           communitarian balance. They serve to advance not just the common good
           but also to protect individual rights. This is often overlooked when DNA
           usages help to serve what might be considered an implicit right—to be
           cleared of police suspicion. This right may be viewed as derivative of the
           right to a speedy trial, although it of course is a distinct one.
             In the United States, there is almost a ritualistic emphasis that the pre-
           sumption of innocence—“innocent until proven guilty”—forms the basis
           of the criminal justice system, and that there are hence two kinds of people:
           the innocent and the convicted. In practice, however, “suspect” forms a
           third category in addition to “innocent” and “guilty.” Numerous people
           have undergone some kind of legal process that has indicated they were
           suspected of having committed a crime, for example by being arrested or
           served a search warrant. These people have diminished rights compared
           to those considered innocent, though not to the extent of those already
           convicted of a crime. For example, they may be subject to fingerprinting
           or detention without charge for a set period of time, while such measures
           would be considered outrageous when applied to innocent people who are
           not suspected of anything.
             If no “guilty” party is found, suspects often remain under a cloud of
           suspicion, sometimes for years. For example, in 1979, fifteen-year-old Jef-
           frey Womack was brought into custody and questioned in relation to the
           murder of a nine-year-old girl; he invoked his right to an attorney and
           refused to say anything to the police, and the case against him was eventu-
           ally dropped due to a lack of evidence. For the next thirty years, members
           of the community and police officers harassed Womack, believing him
           to be a killer. Womack knew that for “practically his entire adult life, he
           would be staked out, followed, rousted, and hounded.” 121  Only in 2008,
           after Jerome Sidney Barrett was charged in the murder 122  thanks to DNA
           testing, 123  was Womack’s name finally cleared.
             Cases like that of Womack, which illustrate the harm suffered by those
           labeled as suspects, illustrate the need for a new right: the right to be
           cleared of suspicion, a derivative but not identical to the right for a speedy
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