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ON POSTMODERNISM AND ARTICULATION 135

            sense  love  and  human  relationships  in  the  postmodern  period  feel  very
            different—more  temporary,  provisional,  contingent.  But  what  we
            are  looking  at  here  is  the  tempering  and  elongation  of  the  very  same
            profound  cultural  and  historical  tendencies  which  constructed  that  break
            with  ‘the  modern’  which  we  call  ‘modernism’.  And  I  want  to  be  able  to
            retain the term ‘modernity’ to refer to the long history—the longue durée—
            of those tendencies.
              Question:  One  of  the  very  distinctive  features  of  the  so-called
            postmodern  theorists  is  their  abandonment  of  issues  of  meaning,
            representation and signification, and ideology. How would you respond to
            this turn?
              SH: There is here a very sharp polarization. I don’t think it is possible to
            conceptualize language without meaning, whereas the postmodernists talk
            about  the  collapse  or  implosion  of  all  meaning.  I  still  talk  about
            representation and signification, whereas Baudrillard says we are at the end
            of  all  representational  and  signifying  practice.  I  still  talk  about  ideology,
            whereas  Foucault  talks  about  the  discursive  which  has  no  ideological
            dimension to it. Perhaps I am in these respects a dinosaur or a recidivist,
            but  I  find  it  very  difficult  to  understand  contemporary  society  and  social
            practice giving up those three orienting points. I am not convinced by the
            theoretical arguments that have been advanced against them.
              First,  let’s  take  Foucault’s  argument  for  the  discursive  as  against  the
            ideological. What Foucault would talk about is the setting in place, through
            the  institutionalization  of  a  discursive  regime,  of  a  number  of  competing
            regimes of truth and, within these regimes, the operation of power though
            the  practices  he  calls  normalization,  regulation  and  surveillance.  Now
            perhaps it’s just a sleight of hand, but the combination of regime of truth
            plus  normalization/regulation/surveillance  is  not  all  that  far  from  the
            notions of dominance in ideology that I’m trying to work with. So maybe
            Foucault’s point is really a polemical, not an analytic one, contesting one
            particular  way  of  understanding  those  terms,  within  a  much  more  linear
            kind  of  base/superstructure  model.  I  think  the  movement  from  that  old
            base/superstructure  paradigm  into  the  domain  of  the  discursive  is  a  very
            positive one. But, while I have learned a great deal from Foucault in this
            sense  about  the  relation  between  knowledge  and  power,  I  don’t  see  how
            you  can  retain  the  notion  of  ‘resistance’,  as  he  does,  without  facing
            questions  about  the  constitution  of  dominance  in  ideology.  Foucault’s
            evasion  of  the  question  is  at  the  heart  of  his  proto-anarchist  position
            precisely  because  his  resistance  must  be  summoned  up  from  nowhere.
            Nobody knows where it comes from. Fortunately, it goes on being there,
            always  guaranteed:  in  so  far  as  there  is  power,  there  is  resistance.  But  at
            any one moment, when you want to know how strong the power is, and
            how  strong  the  resistance  is,  and  what  is  the  changing  balance  of  forces,
            it’s impossible to assess because such a field of force is not conceptualizable
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