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DICK HEBDIGE 189

            the  course  of  his  protracted  debate  with  Habermas  over  the  nature  of
            rationality  and  modernity,  Lyotard  (1984)  has  sought  to  clip  the  angel’s
            wings by recommending that we abandon all those ‘modern’ sciences which
            legitimate  themselves  by  reference  to  a  meta-discourse  which  makes  an
            explicit appeal to ‘some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of the spirit,
            the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working
            subject, or the creation of wealth’ (xxiii).
              In what becomes in effect an explicit renunciation of marxism (Lyotard
            was  a  founder  member  of  the  Socialism  or  Barbarism  group  in  the
            1950s), Lyotard returns to Kant—especially to the critique of judgement—
            to  reflect  upon  the  origins  of  modern  social  thought,  aesthetics  and  the
            relationship  between  the  two.  He  sets  out  to  examine  the  philosohical
            underpinnings of the Enlightenment project which is defined as a twofold
            impetus  towards  universalization  (reason)  and  social  engineering
            (revolution),  both  of  which  find  support  and  legitimacy  in  the  related
            doctrines of progress, social plannning and historical ‘necessity’. Much of
            Lyotard’s  (1986b)  argument  turns  on  an  involved  discussion  of  the
            distinction in Kant (following Burke) between the two orders of aesthetic
            experience:  the  beautiful  and  the  sublime.  Whereas  the  beautiful  in  Kant
            consists in all those views, objects, sounds from which we derive aesthetic
            pleasure  but  which  can  be  framed,  contained,  harmoniously  assimilated,
            the  sublime  is  reserved  for  all  those  phenomena  which  exceed  logical
            containment and which elicit a mixture of both pleasure and terror in the
            viewer  (Burke  mentions,  for  instance,  the  spectacle  of  a  stormy  sea  or  a
            volcano).
              Lyotard  argues  that  in  so  far  as  the  various  modernist  literary  and
            artistic  avant  gardes  attempt  to  ‘present  the  unpresentable’  (through
            abstraction,  alienation,  defamiliarization,  etc.)  they  remain  firmly
            committed  to  an  aesthetics  of  the  sublime  rather  than  the  beautiful.  For
            Lyotard,  a  properly  avant  garde  poem  or  canvas  takes  us  to  this  sublime
            point where consciousness and being bang up against their own limitations
            in  the  prospect  of  absolute  otherness—God  or  infinity—in  the  prospect,
            that is, of their disappearance in death and silence. That encounter compels
            the spectator’s, the reader’s and the artist’s subjectivities to be predicated
            for  as  long  as  it  lasts  in  an  unliveable  tense:  the  post  modern  tense.
            Postmodernity is here defined as a condition that is also a contradiction in
            terms. Lyotard calls this timeless tense the future anterior: ‘post’ meaning
            ‘after’,  ‘modo’  meaning  ‘now’.  (What  Lyotard  calls  ‘post  modernity’  is
            similar to Paul de Man’s (1983) a(nti)historical definition of ‘modernity’ as
            the perpetual present tense within which human beings have always lived
            at  all  times  and  in  all  places  pinioned  forever  between  a  disintegrating,
            irrecoverable,  half  remembered  past  and  an  always  uncertain  future.)
            Lyotard insists on the validity and the viability of this avant garde project
            of the sublime and seeks to promote those artistic practices which pose the
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