Page 134 - The CNN Effect in Action - How the News Media Pushed the West toward War ini Kosovo
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                                                                            THE KOSOVO CRISIS—THE MACRO REVIEW
                                                         CNN effect incident, however, involved almost simultaneous media
                                                         coverage and government activity. This was because of the unique cir-
                                                         cumstances of this incident, in which government officials [OSCE
                                                         (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) monitors
                                                         including head monitor William Walker] and the media arrived on the
                                                         scene at the same time on the day following the massacre. By this time,
                                                         many Western government institutions were heavily involved in the
                                                         Kosovo civil war, compared to the earlier massacres, and had moved
                                                         much closer to supporting the Albanian position on the conflict, which
                                                         allowed them to make judgments regarding the conflict more quickly
                                                         and with less inhibitions than in earlier phases of the conflict.
                                                         Diplomacy versus Policy Actions
                                                         When Western diplomatic and policy-related actions are differentiated,
                                                         as in graph 6.3 and table 6.3, important subtle differences in the pat-
                                                         tern of activity emerge. In the first two incidents relating to the
                                                         Drenica massacre and the Serb offensive in late May, which led to
                                                         NATO’s Operation Determined Falcon, diplomacy and policy-related
                                                         activities were similar in terms of timing and frequency. During the
                                                         four later incidents, however, there are many more policy-related
                                                         actions than diplomatic ones. This could be due to two factors: the
                                                         practical limitations of diplomacy and the increasing number of
                                                         Western government institutions that became involved in Kosovo as
                                                         the crisis evolved. In terms of the practical limits inherent in diplomacy,
                                                         there are only so many high-level meetings amongst Western leaders
                                                         that can be held and only so many foreign dignitaries that Yugoslav
                                                         leaders can accommodate in short periods. This is one reason why
                                                         diplomatic acts were never more than four in any given week during
                                                         the one-year prelude to the intervention. In terms of the increase in
                                                         policy-related activities that followed the last two media incidents, it is
                                                         important to point out that the West found itself more entrenched in
                                                         the conflict over time. This was evident in the range of institutions that
                                                         became involved in the crisis. Initially, after the Drenica massacre, gov-
                                                         ernment involvement was only at the diplomatic level. In the United
                                                         States, the conflict was largely within the domain of the State
                                                         Department, which acted on its own and, through the Contact Group,
                                                         with European allies. It was only in the summer of 1998 that Western
                                                         interest began to take on a greater military dimension with the
                                                         involvement of the U.S. Department of Defense and NATO. As the
                                                         possibilities of war became more likely, the U.S. executive branch
                                                         began to get more involved through the White House. In Europe,
                                                         while the EU did not act collectively on Kosovo except on a few
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