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NOTES
10. Wolfsfeld, Media and Political Conflict, 53.
11. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern
Conscience (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998), 24.
12. Intercoder reliability .81(130/161).
13. Intercoder reliability .93 (150/161).
14. NATO, Press Statement, “Statement to the Press by the Secretary
General Following Decision on the ACTORD,” October 13, 1998,
via http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s981013a.htm.
The Government during
7
the Kosovo Crisis—The Micro Review
1. In January and February 1998, for example, the tensions in Kosovo
were not mentioned during the primary television news reports of the
four major U.S. networks (CNN, NBC, CBS, and ABC). Also, over
these two months, except for two Contact Group meetings, a
Department of Defense press statement, and a diplomatic visit by U.S.
Special Representative Robert Gelbard in late February 1998, there
were no public Western actions regarding Kosovo.
2. These meetings were not solely dedicated to the Kosovo situation and
were originally set up to review the implementation of the Bosnia
Dayton Accords, but dealt with Kosovo after tensions began growing
in the region. These meetings took place in New York on September
24, 1997; in Bonn, Germany on December 9–10, 1997; in
Washington DC on January 8, 1998; and Moscow on February 25,
1998. The meetings in New York, Washington, and Moscow issued
statements on Kosovo. Statements by the Contact Group were issued
on September 24, 1997, January 8, 1998, and February 25, 1998.
3. Contact Group, “Statement on Kosovo,” February 25, 1998.
4. U.S. Department of State, “Robert Gelbard Press Conference,”
Pristina, Serbia, February 22, 1998.
5. According to Robert Gelbard, “we certainly feel that there has been sig-
nificant positive influence by this government to facilitate the establish-
ment of conditions which have led now to a pro-democracy, pro-Dayton
government in Republika Srpska.” U.S. Department of State, “Robert
Gelbard Press Conference,” Belgrade, Serbia, February 23, 1998.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. U.S. Department of State, “Robert Gelbard Press Conference.”
9. Contact Group, “Statement on Kosovo,” London, UK, March 9,
1998. It should be noted that Russia did not endorse all of the
sanctions agreed to by other Contact Group states.
10. According to Resolution 1160, the arms embargo meant: “arms and
related material of all types, including weapons and munitions, mili-
tary vehicles and equipment and spare parts for them. It also decided