Page 149 - The Making of the German Post-war Economy
P. 149

122   THE MAKING OF THE GERMAN POST-WAR ECONOMY

           1946, this figure now rose to 40 per cent; in Berlin, where the situation
           was consistently worse, even up to 74 per cent reported insufficient supply
           of food in February 1947.  Those family treasures  that had not been
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           destroyed by bombs, stolen or broken were now eaten up; and so-called
           ‘Hamstern’, i.e. the illegal trading with farmers and smallholders, did little to
           supplement rationing since farmers did not trust the money. In the winter
           of 1946/47, as many as 60,000 chiefly elderly Germans died of the cold
           and hunger.  In this  situation, various  hunger demonstrations and even
           disturbances took  place all over the western zones. In Wuppertal the
           occupying military forces even had to deploy troops and tanks in order to
           curb the enraged crowd. Confidence in Allied-German cooperation
           deteriorated radically: in January 1946, 15 per cent were pessimistic
           regarding the relations; by the spring of 1947 the figure had risen to 70 per
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           cent.  Similarly, Germans lost faith in the probability of economic
           recovery. Whereas in December 1945 nearly eight in ten  thought  that
           economic conditions would improve,  by April 1947 only  45 per cent
           believed so.  In  the course  of  the first  22 months following the Allied
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           victory the mood among the German populace swung from relief at the
           mere prospect of peace and a fresh start, to stony resignation and growing
           disillusion  mainly due to  the reparations,  the  privileged situation of the
           Allies regarding food supply and the magnitude of the tasks still ahead.
             Due to the then severe economic situation, complicated even further by
           the challenge to integrate some 10 million refugees and expellees from the
           eastern parts  of the former Reich and the German-occupied territories,
           economic and social concerns dominated not only the political but also
           the public debate in spring 1947. Hence, the political parties’ concepts of
           social and economic policy increasingly came to the fore in the run-up to
           the Landtag elections in North Rhine-Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein and
           Lower Saxony on 20 April, and in Baden, Rhineland-Palatinate and
           Wuerttemberg-Hohenzollern on  18  May 1947.  Whereas mainly socio-
           political issues had dominated election campaigns in  the  previous year,
           henceforth socio-economic issues generally displaced these. In contrast to
           the Social Democrats advocating centralist macroeconomic planning and
           the nationalisation of core industries in order to overcome the economic
           and social misery  of that  time, the Christian Democrats competed with
           their concept  of a  Gemeinwirtschaft. While  both parties endorsed
           socialisation, the CDU’s economic programme set clear limits to
           collectivisation and governmental control of the economy by maintaining
           private entrepreneurship. For the time being,  however, the Christian
           Democrats did not venture further economic reforms and, thus, the public
           believed that it observed political parties competing towards the left.  The
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           dire consequences of the war were still too noticeable and most people
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