Page 38 - The Making of the German Post-war Economy
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CONCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION               11

           generally only four  political parties which  had received supra-regional
           prominence were admitted in the three western zones of occupation: the
           oldest party, the socialist SPD, the communist KPD, the politically
           progressive and economically conservative FDP, and the conservative
           CDU. Without doubt, the Bavarian CSU needs to be added here; often
           misunderstood due to the fact that it widely cooperated with the CDU, it
           formally and organisationally constituted an independent party. Thus five
           parties, which could claim representative character at a zonal level,
           received a licence.  Among those,  particularly the two  people’s parties
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           SPD and the CDU held pre-eminent positions with regard to the
           formation and final implementation of the Social  Market Economy in
           post-war West Germany.
             As the western and eastern zones embarked on their steadily divergent
           economic and political paths, occupiers and occupied  formed an
           increasingly close, albeit still unequal, partnership. Although  one cannot
           necessarily infer that party formation meant that the supreme authority of
           the occupying powers was at an end, as suggested by Peter Pulzer,  it
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           enabled and facilitated the emancipation of German politics. In particular
           the American authorities opted for a more cooperative approach and
           conciliatory attitude towards the  West  German people, which  was
           reflected in the speech given by US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, in
           Stuttgart on 6 September 1946:

             When the ruthless Nazi dictatorship  was forced to  surrender
             unconditionally, there was no  German government with which the
             Allies could deal. [...] It never was the intention of the American
             Government to deny to the German people the right to manage their
             own internal affairs as soon as they were able  to do so in a
             democratic way with genuine respect for human rights and
             fundamental freedoms. [...]  It is the view  of the American
             Government that the German people throughout Germany, under
             proper safeguards, should now be given the primary responsibility for
             the running of their own affairs.
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             On 11 July 1947, Washington issued new guidelines that replaced the
           former ‘Directive 1067 by the Joint Chiefs  of Staff (JCS) to the
           Commander-in-Chief of the  US Forces of Occupation Regarding the
           Military Government  of Germany in  the Period  Immediately Following
           the Cessation of Organised Resistance’. Whereas the latter temporary
           wartime document, issued on 26 April 1945, stated that ‘no political
           activities of any kind shall be countenanced unless authorized,’  the new
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           Directive 1779 articulated the determination to rehabilitate Germany and
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