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POLITICAL TRANSITION AND THE PROFESSIONALISATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION | 167

Századvég (‘End of the Century’), which, for example, educated the new political elite
and developed the party’s 1996 platform which was based on its analysis of the first
conservative government’s experiences in 1990–94, and the socialist government’s
radical loss of popularity because of their unpopular economic decisions. The lesson
the party leaders learned was to consider the political communication implications of
the political decision-making process from the outset, to avoid unpopular decisions
while offering popular options,and to recognise the role of the media.The strategic aim
of the party was to establish a strong and socially embedded conservative political
right, and at the same time to destroy totally the social and economic network
supporting the left and liberal sides, so aiming to complete the ‘regime change’ begun
in 1990 by the first right-wing government.

The ‘novelty’ brought by the Young Democrats into political communication between
1998 and 2002 was the intertwining of the state and party communication processes
into a common PR strategy. The basis of this was to reject the idea of a neutral, ‘value
free’ state: the government’s task was to realise the aims and values of the winning
party. The final consequence of this angle was the intertwining of the state ‘success
propaganda’ (aiming at touting its own achievements), and the Young Democrats’
election campaign.

Following their failure at the first round of the 2002 parliamentary elections, the Young
Democrats introduced other types of innovation into Hungarian political
communication. They mobilised huge masses, called them to the streets where mass
meetings were organised to encourage the losers and to terrify the winners of the first
round of the elections. Morally highly questionable methods – for the majority of the
Hungarian public – were used: extremely negative propaganda and scare tactics such
as alarming rumours about their opponents’ future intentions if elected. The smear
campaign was spread by word of mouth, e-mail, SMS text messages, hand-written flyers
and, even, by church leaders who counselled their congregations on where to stand
and whom to support. Political Transition and the Professionalisation of Political Communication

The Young Democrats also expropriated national symbols as means of identification,
labelling the other side as non-Hungarian. In schools, workplaces and on the street,
people looked to see whether one wore the tricolour rosette, the symbol of the 1848
Revolution. This cooption of patriotism was underscored by one of the Young
Democrats’ leaders when he said that those who do not support the national-
conservative value system had better hang themselves. However, this message had a
boomerang effect, generating fear of extreme nationalism, a fear that was amplified by
the opposition.

Having gone into opposition, the party has been able to introduce a politically
galvanising formation outside of Parliament, new to Hungary and perhaps best
compared to Forza Italia ‘Hajrá Magyarok!’ or ‘Go Hungarians!’. The Young Democrats 169