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PROFESSIONALISATION OF POLITICS IN GERMANY | 69

representatives had been close observers during the recent campaigns in the U.S. and
in Great Britain, and later, campaigners met with professionals in both countries and
invited them to Germany (cf.Bergmann & Wickert 1999,p.476).

While the whole campaign – mobilisation, media and advertising campaign – was
centrally organised from campaign headquarters, the Kampa made extensive use of
outside expertise by hiring a total of eight agencies to handle specialised campaign
tasks. The Kampa was divided into ten departments. One of them organised Offensive
98, targeting 32 constituencies selected for intensified campaigning. This is linked to
Germany’s electoral system, which is a personalised proportional system giving each
voter two votes – one for the party, the other for a (regional) candidate. The 32
constituencies targeted by Offensive 98 were mainly constituencies where the CDU had
won in 1994 against the SPD with only a slight margin. The campaign in these
constituencies was designed according to detailed findings from survey research and
supported by appearances from high-ranking party representatives. Polling in general,
supplemented by tests of advertising material in focus groups, played a prominent role
in the 1998 campaign. Early surveys provided the basis for an analysis of the starting
position. Repeated surveys during the campaign allowed for control and possible
changes of strategies. Members of the polling institutes hired by the SPD were
constantly present at the Kampa.

In addition to being the campaign headquarters, and thus securing central planning
and appearance, the Kampa fulfilled a symbolic function. The image of a centralised
campaign management pulling the strings demonstrated professionalism to the party
members and the public. This was important for a party that four years earlier had
found it difficult to show unity and to back its top candidate,and that,in early 1998,had
two candidates who – more or less openly – competed for the nomination as the Social
Democratic chancellor candidate. Demonstrating fighting power with the Kampa
provided members with the confidence of victory and gave the electorate, as well as
the competing parties, the impression of competence. This function was further
emphasised by the SPD’s main campaign slogan: Until the nomination of the chancellor
candidate, the party ran the slogan ‘Wir sind bereit’(We’re ready), which changed to ‘Ich
bin bereit’(I’m ready) as soon as Gerhard Schröder was nominated.

Parties, when confronted with the weakening of party ties based on social position or
partisanship, try to avoid polarising issues in their campaign. The two big German Professionalisation of Politics in Germany
parties in particular, though having developed out of religious and class cleavages,
today present themselves as catch-all parties. Again, following the model of the British
Labour Party and The Third Way, the SPD in 1998 labelled its course Die neue Mitte (The
New Centre). Despite its vagueness, the party tried to position itself with this slogan in
the middle of the party spectrum and thus attract voters suspicious of the left.Similarly,
the SPD made innovation one of its main campaign issues.An innovation congress held
in mid-1997, even before the Kampa was set up, was the first attempt at active agenda- 71