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Fallen Eagles: Bet on Resilience, Not on Strategy                     17


          motorcycles, and acting without the knowledge of corporate manage-
          ment, the Honda representatives nevertheless decided that selling motor-
          cycles was their only option, having failed to achieve straightforward U.S.
          market entry earlier with automobiles. In retrospect, Honda appeared to
          have executed a brilliant strategy (see the BCG report  Strategy
          Alternatives for the British Motorcycle Industry, 1973). Similarly, Best
          Buy, a highly successful U.S. consumer electronics retailer, saw the begin-
          ning of its big-box retailing in electronics in a Midwestern tornado that
          caused water damage to the inventory. Discounted electronics were a hit,
          and thereby a business model was born. Serendipity, rather than strategy,
          was the true force at work.
             Strategy has been the bulwark against uncertainty, on one hand, and
          the magic wand for success on the other. [Think of “blue ocean strate-
          gies” by Kim and Mauborgne (2005), for example, where the focus is on
          the discovery of the heretofore “uncompeted” business arenas.] Perhaps
          only the word innovation is more reliable than strategy for lifting spirits
          toward victory. Yet strategy has diminished in stature due to its proven
          inability to cope with fundamental shifts in the business environment.
          “No visibility” was the expression used by the CEO John Chambers of
          Cisco Systems in the dot-com bust of the 2000. “Impossible to call” say
          many more executives in 2009, though the Nokia CEO Olli-Pekka
          Kallasvuo claimed “the freefall” had ended in late spring 2009. Indeed,
          even in the best times, the role of strategy is unclear: “The market was
          growing so fast there was no need for strategy” was one executive’s expla-
          nation of his company’s process in the late 1990s. Just crank those phones
          out, efficiently and reliably. No wonder Nokia’s strongest suit is logistics
          (Arlbjorn et al., 2008).
             Rarely is there only one way to see a situation. Some people would claim
          that Nokia’s success was due to an agile strategy (Doz & Kosonen, 2008);
          others would suggest it was being in the right place at the right time: the
          company benefited from a long-term investment in radio technology; the
          free markets in telephony in Finland; the Nordic GSM standard; the rise
          from a deep recession that created a sort of “winter war mentality” (Finnish
          for a determination to win); the support of the state in R&D; and the rapid
          expansion of education of electrical engineers in Finland (see Lovio, 1993).
          Such ambiguity is both the demise and the promise of strategy. That there
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