Page 477 - The Toyota Way Fieldbook

446 THE TOYOTA WAY FIELDBOOK

producing parts, interviews with operators, engineers, and managers
led to the following overview:

Equipment
Downtime Scrap Rate Rework

X10 Line 30% 6% 15%

A1 Line 2% 1% < 1%

The majority of downtime on the A1 line was reported as being caused
by material shortages from the in-house process located adjacent to
the A1 machining line that performs the previous operations, while the
downtime on the X10 line was due to quality and machine breakdowns
within the line. These X10 quality issues have since warranted that every
finished piston is gauged in an area 100 yards from the machining line
before being sent to assembly. Contrary to this, pistons made on the
A1 line are gauged in sample lots every 1,000 parts.

After nearly three years’ and hundreds of thousands of dollars in
consulting fees, Yoshina’s personal frustration became overwhelming.
Despite his best efforts, he felt as though he was adding little value to
the transition team and left Acme to return to Japan in mid-2003.
What Can We Learn from the Tale of Two Pistons?
1. Knowledgeable and committed leadership is the key to suc-
cessful lean transformation. We’re often asked why companies
are not busily implementing everything they can learn from
Toyota, given the success of the Toyota Way. Is it cultural? Is it
resistance to change? This case gets to the crux of the matter.
First and foremost it is leadership. This plant had all the ingredi-
ents needed for successful change: high level management sup-
port, a track record of success with lean, access to all of the lean
tools and training materials, a clean sheet to work with, and one
of the best experts in the world as a full-time advisor.
The A1 project engineer believed and wanted to learn. The plant
manager let him set up the line as he saw fit. We give the plant
manager credit for not interfering. But when the X10 project
engineer resisted the opportunity to learn and reverted to tradi-
tional thinking, the plant manager quickly sided with him in
blocking Yoshina’s fresh ideas, exemplified in his approving the
convoluted flow to fit into the existing space, instead of stretching
to achieve the recommended straight-line flow. It seemed the
plant manager had everything to gain by following the advice of