Page 201 - Toyota Under Fire

TOYOT A UNDER FIRE

many organizations have studied Toyota’s approach to decision
making and goal setting, hoping to emulate it. Generally it is a
great set of practices, but in the midst of a fast-moving crisis that
had little basis in engineering analyses or technical specifications,
it became a liability. While the company was moving slowly and
methodically, it appeared to the outside world as though it didn’t
know what to do. In the midst of the crisis, stories began pop-
ping up in the media that focused on diagnosing how Toyota
had fallen so drastically from its perch atop the quality and safety
ratings. For instance, The Economist’s December 10, 2009, cover
featured the headline “Toyota Slips Up,” accompanied by an im-
age of a banana on wheels.

Communication Problems

Up until February of 2010, as each new recall issue arose, sub-
stantive or speculative, Toyota, with decisions being made pri-
marily in Japan, reacted as if these were minor and unrelated
incidents. Toyota managers in the United States at TMS, TMA,
and particularly the external affairs divisions were feeling the heat
rising to an unbearable degree as they responded to thousands of
communications a day. Yet, in Japan, there was limited pressure
to be proactive to contain the crisis and the downward-spiraling
perceptions of Toyota quality in the United States through much
of January.
One example is the mounting media speculation about prob-
lems with Toyota electronics that began in the fall of 2009. See-
ing the media take hold of unfounded allegations of electronics
problems, Paul Williamsen, the manager of Lexus College, was
asked by the TMS communications group to begin crafting a re-
sponse that included a detailed explanation of Toyota’s electronic

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