Page 237 - Toyota Under Fire

TOYOT A UNDER FIRE

facing. As we noted in Chapter 4, this wasn’t a policy edict that
was issued by senior executives; that policy didn’t have to be is-
sued at all. The approach was a natural outgrowth of the culture
of respect for people. Akio Toyoda says that when he was prepar-
ing to speak at the congressional hearings, this culture led him to
a decision about how he would respond to questions and accu-
sations:

At the time I was very severely criticized. People sug-
gested that I was trying to escape from the problems in
the United States or that I was lying, which was abso-
lutely appalling. It was very difficult for me to face. But
one thing that I decided was I would never point fingers
at somebody else. I decided I would never blame others.

Not blaming others extended from customers to suppliers to
regulators and even critics in the media and expert witnesses
for lawyers fighting against the company. We’ve noted the repeated
apologies to customers and the decision to accept responsibility
for the sticky pedal design and to deflect negative attention from
CTS. One of Toyota’s missteps early in the recall crisis was in its
communication about the floor mat and pedal shape recall in
November 2009, which could be interpreted as disrespectful of
the independence of the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA)—independence that the NHTSA took pains
to reaffirm when it publicly criticized Toyota’s communication
on the issue. Since then, Toyota has taken pains to communicate
frequently with the NHTSA and become a model of cooperation
and responsiveness, including not contesting the fines that the
NHTSA levied.

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