Page 239 - Toyota Under Fire

TOYOT A UNDER FIRE

resources to fix many of those problems quickly. For instance,
that’s why the SMART idea took root quickly, why budget was
quickly allocated to allow quality engineers to go visit custom-
ers and dealerships much more frequently, and, most important,
how significant organization changes were made quickly.
Between February and July 2010, the new regional chief
quality officer position was created and staffed around the world,
the number of American chief engineers with responsibility for
vehicle design in the United States doubled, and Americans
were appointed as presidents of every American manufactur-
ing plant—all from within. St. Angelo and the other Americans
didn’t suddenly become capable of filling these roles when the
crisis erupted; their adherence to the Toyota Way had been de-
veloped over many years. The fact that they hadn’t assumed such
roles already was a failure to live up to the standard of genchi
genbutsu, but it was this standard that made it possible for the
company to move quickly to correct that failure. There was wide-
spread agreement that these appointments were overdue.
Even after the appointments, there was a renewed commit-
ment to genchi genbutsu. St. Angelo remembers running into
Akio Toyoda and Yoshimi Inaba in the Cincinnati airport just
after he was appointed in February 2010, when the recall crisis
was raging and questions about Toyota’s electronics systems were
still rampant. He took the opportunity to ask Toyoda and Inaba
about the allegations of electronics problems directly. After reas-
suring him that there was no evidence of problems, St. Angelo
described how, “Akio Toyoda looked me in the face, and said,
‘But, a key element of the Toyota Way, Steve, is genchi genbutsu.
You can’t just take my word for it. You can’t just look at a report.
You’ve got to go see and look for yourself. Go to the point of con-
cern and look for yourself.’ And then Inaba-san said, ‘Steve, take

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