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SUPERCULTURE  FOR  THE  COMMUNIC ATION  AG E

            work discursively in global politics, especially foreign policy discussions. Within
            those political discourses universalism has even been appropriated by the West
            in a quasi-religious way. Former American President George Bush claimed to
            speak on behalf of the entire global population in the early 1990s, for instance,
            when he referred to a post-Cold-War ‘new world order’ in defense of his
            military intervention in Iraq. In a world of ‘shared principles’, Bush told the
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            American public in his 1991 State of the Union address, ‘America has selessly
            confronted evil for the sake of good in a land so far away’. Universalist dis-
            courses have become a stamp of American political imaging, a strategy that
            tries  to  mainstream  global  consciousness  into  an  American  perspective.  For
            example,  former  President  Bill  Clinton  told  a  televised  gathering  at  Beijing
            University in 1998 that the right to free expression, association, and religion
            ‘are  not  American  rights  or  European  rights  or  developed  world  rights  . . .
            these are the birthrights of people everywhere’. The triumph of global capital-
            ism over communism in the late twentieth century is often said to validate the
            belief that Western values are universal, or at least they should be.
              We need not further berate American foreign policy (though that’s never a
            completely bad idea). In practise, ‘universal values’ will never materialize as
            globally standardized cultural values. They will however remain highly visible
            discursive themes. Mass media play a crucial role. The widespread visibility of
            universalist themes derives in considerable measure from the fact that (mainly
            Western) international news media create stories that are framed around a sen-
            sationalized  moral  tension  concerning  abuses  of  ‘human  rights’,  the  best
            example of which may be the persistent accusations of the People’s Republic
            of  China.  Organizations  such  as  Amnesty  International  help  to  arrange  the
            agenda for news coverage of such stories, perhaps most famously the reports
            about the plight of the indigenous population in Chiapas, Mexico.
              Human rights may be the most visible of the universal domains, but people
            also have a sense of shared standards of aesthetics and physical beauty, of basic
            sexual and survival needs, and of common forms of emotion and expression.
            Media play a major role in bringing these rather abstract commonalities out
            too. In his cautiously optimistic assessment of television’s influence on culture,
            for  example,  Ulf  Hannerz  points  out  that  ‘the  sight  of  starving  children  in
            Ethiopia, or of victims of a grenade thrown into a Sarajevo market . . . seems
            capable of provoking a kind of electronic empathy, a view of the other which
            has more to do with notions of shared human nature than with cultivated
            differences’ (Hannerz 1996: 121).
              Universalism is itself not a cultural effect, result, or conclusion but a process
            of global recognition that resonates with the ideologies and cultural values of
            major societal institutions – religious organizations, political treaties, national
            constitutions, and the international mass media among them. What matters in
            construction  of  the  superculture  is  the  discursive  presence  of  the  universal
            cultural  themes,  not  any  pretense  of  essential  truth  or  global  consensus.
            Universal themes enter human experience discursively where they encourage

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