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252———Narcoterrorism
Coca, the main ingredient of cocaine, is indigenous have failed. Few political concessions can induce a
to Colombia. As cocaine consumption increased world- group to lay down its arms once it is no longer reliant
wide during the 1970s, coca became a major cash crop on the support of some part of the populace.
for many Colombian peasants, one whose profit margin The FARC’s case, while prominent and extreme, is
was vastly superior to every other. This decade also saw one of many. Colombia’s National Liberation Army
the rise of the FARC. The group’s goal—to inspire a (ELN) and United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) have
Marxist revolt among the Colombian peasantry—is exhibited a growing dependence on drug profits, as
political and originated independent of drug trafficking. have the Shining Path in Peru and dozens of smaller
As with any guerrilla army or rebel group, however, groups in Southeast Asia, including the Liberation
one of the FARC’s goals was to drive government Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The Taliban in Afghanistan also
armed forces from its areas of operation. The FARC used drug profits as a major source of funds for several
had had some success in the remote Colombian years; in the months before its downfall, the regime had
countryside. banned poppy cultivation in an effort to improve its rep-
When the FARC was firmly in control of remote utation and secure aid money. Following the Taliban’s
areas and effectively replacing government authority, destruction, poppy growing has burgeoned. (The
it began to traffic in drugs. Initially, this may have Northern Alliance forces, currently allied with the
grown out of its assertion of control: the FARC exacts United States, had been even more dependent on drug
“taxes,” or extortion payments, from every landowner revenues for funds.) Given the extremely close rela-
or business in the areas it controls—coca-growing tions between the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in
peasants were no different from coffee-growing peas- Afghanistan, drug money is almost certainly a major
ants, and coca traffickers no different from coffee source of revenue for Al Qaeda also.
exporters. The revenues the FARC received from drug
traffickers and growers were considerably higher than TERRORISM AS AN OUTGROWTH
those realized from legal industries, however. The OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
guerrillas quickly moved from taxing the traffickers
to offering to protect coca markets, labs, and airstrips The second type of narcoterrorism grows out of drug
from government attack. For the narcoguerrilla, the trafficking itself. Just as the vast profits generated by
illegal nature of both the drug trade and the rebellion the drug trade tend to transform political rebellions
were complementary; untrammeled by national or into criminal enterprises, they tend to create criminal
international law, guerrillas can openly offer traffick- empires with evolving political agendas.
ers their services, and traffickers are happy to pay Any legal multi-billion-dollar industry, particularly
richly for that protection. one dominated by a few key firms, will attempt to
Drug profits allowed the FARC to expand aggres- influence political policies that affect the industry.
sively throughout the 1980s and 1990s; the FARC However, legitimate businesses are often restrained by
recruited more troops and equipped them better than law from exercising certain types of political influ-
their Army counterparts. At the same time, the FARC’s ence. The illegality of drug trafficking makes bribery
reliance on drug money unmoored it from the causes necessary, and corruption of the government is
and grievances that had inspired its formation. As inevitable. Drug traffickers may begin by buying the
the FARC no longer had to depend on popular support silence of local officials—village mayors, local police,
to survive, it quickly lost it. However, the incredible even Army lieutenants—in areas of production. As a
wealth the FARC realized from its participation in cartel becomes more influential, it is able to buy the
the drug trade (revenues are currently estimated to be influence of ever more powerful officials—senators
between $300 million and $1 billion yearly) allowed it and members of congress, the chief of the national
to continue to attract recruits and expand its territory. police, Army generals. If an official cannot or will not
The group currently controls almost 40 percent of be corrupted, drug traffickers usually resort to violence
Columbia’s land area. against the official or the official’s family. Bribery and
The FARC is a premier example of the unique dan- violence are typical of most organized crime syndi-
ger of narcoterrorism: the potential for drug profits to cates; however, as they serve merely to enable drug
turn a rebellion into a self-perpetuating criminal enter- traffickers to operate and not to influence politics,
prise. Several attempts at negotiation with the FARC many experts do not classify them as terrorist acts.