Page 273 - Encyclopedia Of Terrorism
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           252———Narcoterrorism


             Coca, the main ingredient of cocaine, is indigenous  have failed. Few political concessions can induce a
           to Colombia. As cocaine consumption increased world-  group to lay down its arms once it is no longer reliant
           wide during the 1970s, coca became a major cash crop  on the support of some part of the populace.
           for many Colombian peasants, one whose profit margin  The FARC’s case, while prominent and extreme, is
           was vastly superior to every other. This decade also saw  one of many. Colombia’s National Liberation  Army
           the rise of the FARC. The group’s goal—to inspire a  (ELN) and United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) have
           Marxist revolt among the Colombian peasantry—is    exhibited a growing dependence on drug profits, as
           political and originated independent of drug trafficking.  have the Shining Path in Peru and dozens of smaller
           As with any guerrilla army or rebel group, however,  groups in Southeast  Asia, including the Liberation
           one of the FARC’s goals was to drive government    Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The Taliban in Afghanistan also
           armed forces from its areas of operation. The FARC  used drug profits as a major source of funds for several
           had had some success in the remote Colombian       years; in the months before its downfall, the regime had
           countryside.                                       banned poppy cultivation in an effort to improve its rep-
             When the FARC was firmly in control of remote    utation and secure aid money. Following the Taliban’s
           areas and effectively replacing government authority,  destruction, poppy growing has burgeoned. (The
           it began to traffic in drugs. Initially, this may have  Northern  Alliance forces, currently allied with the
           grown out of its assertion of control: the FARC exacts  United States, had been even more dependent on drug
           “taxes,” or extortion payments, from every landowner  revenues for funds.) Given the extremely close rela-
           or business in the areas it controls—coca-growing  tions between  the  Taliban and  Al Qaeda forces in
           peasants were no different from coffee-growing peas-  Afghanistan, drug money is almost certainly a major
           ants, and coca traffickers no different from coffee  source of revenue for Al Qaeda also.
           exporters. The revenues the FARC received from drug
           traffickers and growers were considerably higher than  TERRORISM AS AN OUTGROWTH
           those realized from legal industries, however.  The  OF CRIMINAL VIOLENCE
           guerrillas quickly moved from taxing the traffickers
           to offering to protect coca markets, labs, and airstrips  The second type of narcoterrorism grows out of drug
           from government attack. For the narcoguerrilla, the  trafficking itself. Just as the vast profits generated by
           illegal nature of both the drug trade and the rebellion  the drug trade tend to transform political rebellions
           were complementary; untrammeled by national or     into criminal enterprises, they tend to create criminal
           international law, guerrillas can openly offer traffick-  empires with evolving political agendas.
           ers their services, and traffickers are happy to pay  Any legal multi-billion-dollar industry, particularly
           richly for that protection.                        one dominated by a few key firms, will attempt to
             Drug profits allowed the FARC to expand aggres-  influence political policies that affect the industry.
           sively throughout the 1980s and 1990s; the FARC    However, legitimate businesses are often restrained by
           recruited more troops and equipped them better than  law from exercising certain types of political influ-
           their Army counterparts. At the same time, the FARC’s  ence. The illegality of drug trafficking makes bribery
           reliance on drug money unmoored it from the causes  necessary, and corruption of the government is
           and grievances that had inspired its formation.  As  inevitable. Drug traffickers may begin by buying the
           the FARC no longer had to depend on popular support  silence of local officials—village mayors, local police,
           to survive, it quickly lost it. However, the incredible  even Army lieutenants—in areas of production. As a
           wealth the FARC realized from its participation in  cartel becomes more influential, it is able to buy the
           the drug trade (revenues are currently estimated to be  influence of ever more powerful officials—senators
           between $300 million and $1 billion yearly) allowed it  and members of congress, the chief of the national
           to continue to attract recruits and expand its territory.  police, Army generals. If an official cannot or will not
           The group currently controls almost 40 percent of  be corrupted, drug traffickers usually resort to violence
           Columbia’s land area.                              against the official or the official’s family. Bribery and
             The FARC is a premier example of the unique dan-  violence are typical of most organized crime syndi-
           ger of narcoterrorism: the potential for drug profits to  cates; however, as they serve merely to enable drug
           turn a rebellion into a self-perpetuating criminal enter-  traffickers to operate and not to influence politics,
           prise. Several attempts at negotiation with the FARC  many experts do not classify them as terrorist acts.
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