Page 277 - Encyclopedia Of Terrorism

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256———National Liberation Front of Corsica

the government forces could withdraw, the ELN found have denied Corsica any distinctive regional autonomy,
itself faced with a new threat—the United Self- never recognized inhabitants of Corsica as a distinct
Defense Forces of Columbia (AUC), a right-wing nationality, and have never given official status to the
paramilitary organization that opposed any negotia- Corsican language. As a result, the FLNC claims to be
tions with the guerrillas and that believed it could fighting French “internal colonialism.”
defeat the ELN militarily. By April 2001, a string of Corsica has always expressed discontent with
AUC victories left the ELN scrambling to regain con- French rule, even before its annexation in 1769.
trol of its territory. As of this writing, peace negotia- Although the Paris-based government provides funds
tions between FARC and the government have broken for public services and infrastructure, a wide economic
down, and the government has resumed military gap between the island and the mainland still remains.
operations against the guerrillas. In March 2002, the This, coupled with the settling of non-Corsicans on the
administration of U.S. president George W. Bush asked island, has continued to fuel Corsican nationalism.
Congress to increase the military aid package to During the 1980s, the FLNC split into two groups:
Colombia to help that country combat the guerrillas. the Canal Historique (“Historical Faction”) and the
Canal Habituel (“Usual Faction”). A series of new,
See also ERNESTO (CHE) GUEVARA; REVOLUTIONARY ARMED
smaller divisions formed and a number of other ter-
FORCES OF COLOMBIA; UNITED SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF
rorist organizations followed, most of which lasted
COLOMBIA
only a few years. The FLNC-canal historique and the
Further Reading FLNC-canal habituel thus remained the most impor-
tant terrorist organizations; the latter, however, ended
Kline, Harvey F. Democracy Under Assault. New York: activities in 1997.
Westview, 1995. In the 1990s, the FLNC became more violent.
Kline, Harvey F. State Building and Conflict Resolution in Dozens of people were killed, including mayors,
Colombia, 1986–94. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
Press, 1999. police officers, and other state workers. The violence
Safford, Frank, and Marco Palacios. Colombia: Frag- culminated in the 1998 assassination of Prefect Claude
mented Land, Divided Society. New York: Oxford Erignac, the highest representative of the French
University Press, 2002. Republic on the island. The assassination was highly
“U.S. Wades Into Colombia’s Dirty War: 50 Years of publicized and criticized so strongly that the FLNC
Conflict.” The Guardian, August 30, 2000, 3. publicly denied—and abjured—the attack.
Wilson, Scott. “Colombian Right’s ‘Cleaning’ Campaign; In 1999, the FLNC-canal historique merged with
Takeover in Major City Illustrates Political Side of Drug some of the other underground organizations, taking
War.” Washington Post, April 17, 2001, A1. the name “FLNC” again. With an estimated 600 mem-
bers (organized horizontally into independent cells),
the FLNC remains most active in Corsica, only occa-
NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT sionally bombing a building in mainland France.
OF CORSICA Although carrying out 200 to 800 bombings a year,
FLNC has caused few deaths. The FLNC funds itself
aka Front de Libération Nationale de la Corse, through armed robberies of banks and extortion of
Frontu di Liberazione Naziunalista Corsu
what it refers to as “revolutionary taxes.”
Most Corsicans wish to protect Corsican identity
The National Liberation Front of Corsica (FLNC) is and stimulate peaceful economic growth; only a small
the largest and most violent of the Corsican nationalist minority supports the radical autonomists but the “see
movements. Formed in 1976 from two smaller groups nothing, say nothing” attitude is generally accepted.
seeking self-government for Corsica through force, the Despite the frequent bombings, the FLNC is con-
FLNC has engaged in more than 20 years of violence. sidered relatively unthreatening; thus the French gov-
The FLNC has been responsible for thousands of ernment has little incentive to come to the bargaining
bomb attacks on property of non-Corsican settlers, table. The French government has, however, recently
police stations, government offices (in both Corsica granted more autonomy to Corsica; in addition, it has
and France), and other symbolic targets of the “colo- provided new aid for infrastructure development and
nial state” in Corsica. Successive French governments for the teaching of the Corsican language in primary