Page 160 - An Introduction to Political Communication Fifth Edition

Intro to Politics Communication (5th edn)-p.qxp 9/2/11 10:55 Page 139

POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS
the public representatives of the Labour Party showed themselves to lack
confidence and faith in their own approach to the issue.
This confusion, and other failures of the 1983 campaign, prompted Neil
Kinnock, shortly after he became party leader, to form a ‘communication and
campaigns directorate’ which would bring all of Labour’s public relations
activities within one management structure, headed by Peter Mandelson. In
1985 a Campaign Management Team was established under senior Kinnock
adviser Patricia Hewitt, with responsibility for preparing and executing
‘long’ campaigns, well in advance of the actual election. Thus, when the
1987 campaign started, party leaders had an agenda of issues and ‘theme
days’ to work through.
In 1985 Peter Mandelson, as communications director, recommended the
creation of an apparatus which could co-ordinate the party’s public relations,
marketing and advertising work. It would function within the context of an
agreed communication strategy; a unified presentation of the political
message, using all available media; and high-quality publicity materials. 8
The Shadow Communications Agency, as it was called, would enlist as
many sympathetic volunteers from the world of professional communica-
tion as possible. With the help of advertising professional Philip Gould,
Mandelson and the SCA strove, with some success, to prevent the inco-
herence of the 1983 campaign from ever happening again. Hughes and
Wintour argue that ‘Mandelson and Gould succeeded, not because they
exploited slick advertising and media management more effectively than the
Conservatives, but because they forged between themselves an approach to
political strategy which has never before been seen. . . . They welded policy,
politics and image-creation into one weapon’ (1993, p. 183). A post-1997
Labour minister recalls that ‘Peter was fascinated by the acres of empty space
columnists and political reporters have to fill every week. It was then that he
realised that any titbit he gave them would be eagerly grabbed by the
journalist who didn’t seem to do any work for himself’. 9
In the campaign of 1987, however, even a vastly improved structure of
internal communication management could not prevent Labour’s defence
policy from once again upsetting the strategy. We have already referred to
Kinnock’s disastrous interview with David Frost. In 1987, as in 1983, senior
leaders’ confusion about, and apparent lack of commitment to, the party’s
non-nuclear defence policy greatly weakened the campaign overall. Despite
the efforts of Mandelson, Gould, Hewitt and the SCA ‘it was hopeless to
imagine that the party could successfully campaign on a non-nuclear policy,
when the policy itself was internally inconsistent, and self-evidently evasive’
(ibid., p. 16).
The work of the Shadow Communications Agency carried on to the 1992
election, when it was suggested that the party should ‘deal with Mr Kinnock’s
image problem by giving a higher profile to attractive and able front-benchers.
He should be protected from hazards, particularly from contact with the

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