Page 164 - An Introduction to Political Communication Fifth Edition

Intro to Politics Communication (5th edn)-p.qxp 9/2/11 10:55 Page 143

POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS
the Conservatives reappointed Saatchi and Saatchi to plan and co-ordinate
communications strategy in all its aspects. The agency developed a ‘long’
campaign, stressing the Tories’ economic competence and raising anxieties
about Labour’s ‘tax and spend’ plans. ‘The government was urged to seize the
opportunity to dominate the news, exploiting ministerial statements, parlia-
mentary questions, control of parliamentary time, and, ultimately, the Budget’
(Butler and Kavanagh, 1992, p. 81).
The ‘short’ campaign, when it came, was generally perceived as being
much more successful than that of 1987 (although in the election itself the
government’s majority was cut to 22). In 1992, unlike 1987,

10 Downing Street was to be intimately linked with operations in
Central Office and there would be close relations between the Prime
Minister and the party chairman; there would be a coherent
communications strategy to which all party spokesmen would be
expected to adhere; there would be no battle between rival adver-
tising agencies, for advertising was exclusively in the hands of
Saatchi and Saatchi; there would be a major effort to co-ordinate
the content and timing of ministers’ speeches, press conferences,
election broadcasts, and photo-opportunities, and key ministers
would accord priority to appearing on regional television.
(Ibid., p. 86)

In so far as this strategy resulted in electoral victory, it was undeniably
successful. While, as we have seen, John Major’s image was self-consciously
‘unconstructed’, the co-ordination and synchronisation of the Tories’ overall
political message was carefully planned and expertly executed.
Between 1992 and 1997, however, it all went wrong for the Conservatives.
As noted above, a series of ‘sleaze’ scandals and major policy differences over
European union destroyed its capacity to control and shape the news agenda,
leaving the leadership helpless in the face of self-inflicted, self-destructive
division and in-fighting. When the 1997 election campaign began, it was, we
can now see with hindsight, already over, with the Tories reduced to their
worst electoral showing for more than a century. Much of this collapse was
the product of poor internal communication, as candidates failed to receive
adequate leadership from the party’s central office and factions developed
around contrasting approaches to Europe. In 1997 the Tories were as ineffec-
tual in their internal communication and campaign co-ordination as the
Labour Party had ever been.
Following the 1997 defeat the Tories elected a new leader, William Hague,
but remained unable to mount a serious challenge to Tony Blair’s govern-
ment. As was to be expected, the scale of the 1997 defeat set in motion
a process of reform and renewal in both the content and the style of
Conservative communication which was always going to be difficult (even if

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