Page 173 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition

COMMUNICATING POLITICS

particularly those involved in a public capacity) are aware of the
‘message’ to be delivered at any given time, and to ensure that the
different elements of the public relations operation are working
with each other effectively. Failure to put in place such channels can
result in public relations disasters and electoral failures, as the
Labour Party found to its cost in the 1983 campaign. Hughes and
Wintour note that ‘the party [in 1983] ran an inept and disorgan-
ised campaign, led by one of the least appropriate figures ever to
head either of the two dominant political parties’ (1993, p. 6). We
have already referred to some of the problems associated with then
Labour leader Michael Foot’s personal image. Equally damaging, if
not more so, to the party’s campaign in 1983 was the general lack
of co-ordination and planning in the public presentation of policy.
Heffernan and Marqusee agree that the 1983 campaign was ‘badly
organised and its media strategy non-existent’ (1992, p. 28), and
that defence policy in particular was mishandled: ‘A spreading
cloud of political double talk obscured the basic humanistic
message about nuclear disarmament which, opinion polls had
shown, was capable of commanding substantial public support’
(ibid., p. 32).
Elsewhere I have examined in some detail Labour’s handling of
its defence policy in 1983 (McNair, 1988, 1989). An analysis of
television news coverage of the campaign revealed that Labour’s
leadership failed to make a coherent statement of the policy, not
least because Denis Healey, Michael Foot, Roy Hattersley, and
other senior figures appeared to disagree on important aspects of it.
While the Conservatives in 1983 fought an incisive and aggressive
campaign against Labour’s non-nuclear defence programme, the
public representatives of the Labour Party showed themselves to
lack confidence and faith in their own approach to the issue.
This confusion, and other failures of the 1983 campaign,
prompted Neil Kinnock, shortly after he became party leader, to
form a ‘communication and campaigns directorate’ which would
bring all of Labour’s public relations activities within one manage-
ment structure, headed by Peter Mandelson. In 1985 a Campaign
Management Team was established under senior Kinnock adviser
Patricia Hewitt, with responsibility for preparing and executing
‘long’ campaigns, well in advance of the actual election. Thus, when
the 1987 campaign started, party leaders had an agenda of issues
and ‘theme days’ to work through.
In 1985 Peter Mandelson, as communications director, recom-
mended the creation of an apparatus which could co-ordinate the

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