Page 174 - An Introduction to Political Communication Third Edition

POLITICAL PUBLIC RELATIONS

party’s public relations, marketing and advertising work. It would
function within the context of an agreed communication strategy; a
unified presentation of the political message, using all available
media; and high-quality publicity materials. 7
The Shadow Communications Agency, as it was called, would
enlist as many sympathetic volunteers from the world of pro-
fessional communication as possible. With the help of advertising
professional Philip Gould, Mandelson and the SCA strove, with
some success, to prevent the incoherence of the 1983 campaign
from ever happening again. Hughes and Wintour argue that
‘Mandelson and Gould succeeded, not because they exploited slick
advertising and media management more effectively than the
Conservatives, but because they forged between themselves an
approach to political strategy which has never before been seen. . . .
They welded policy, politics and image-creation into one weapon’
(1993, p. 183). A post-1997 Labour minister recalls that ‘Peter was
fascinated by the acres of empty space columnists and political
reporters have to fill every week. It was then that he realised that
any titbit he gave them would be eagerly grabbed by the journalist
who didn’t seem to do any work for himself’. 8
In the campaign of 1987, however, even a vastly improved
structure of internal communication management could not prevent
Labour’s defence policy from once again upsetting the strategy. We
have already referred to Kinnock’s disastrous interview with David
Frost. In 1987, as in 1983, senior leaders’ confusion about, and
apparent lack of commitment to, the party’s non-nuclear defence
policy greatly weakened the campaign overall. Despite the efforts of
Mandelson, Gould, Hewitt and the SCA ‘it was hopeless to imagine
that the party could successfully campaign on a non-nuclear policy,
when the policy itself was internally inconsistent, and self-evidently
evasive’ (ibid., p. 16).
The work of the Shadow Communications Agency carried on to
the 1992 election, when it was suggested that the party should ‘deal
with Mr Kinnock’s image problem by giving a higher profile to
attractive and able front-benchers. He should be protected from
hazards, particularly from contact with the tabloids, and should
appear in as many statesman-like settings as possible’ (ibid., p. 88).
Thus, he was seen touring the country in a distinguished, ‘prime
ministerial’ car, flanked by police outriders, and carrying himself
with the bearing of one confidently on the verge of real political
power. Slick, photogenic and somewhat bland front-bench spokes-
persons like Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were preferred in

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